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ABSTRACT 
Less than a decade since the end of Sri Lanka's grueling civil war in 2009, the 
country may once again find itself threatened by communal violence. Sri Lanka’s Muslim 
minority population is mobilizing around Islamist politics. Conversely, Buddhist 
Nationalists, inspired by instrumental politicians and the perceived threat of Islamization, 
are mobilizing against the Muslim population. This thesis asks: how and why is Islamism 
growing among the Muslim minority population of Sri Lanka? This thesis will test two 
hypotheses: first, the Muslim minority population in Sri Lanka is mobilizing around 
Islamism in reaction to growing Buddhist Nationalism; second, the Muslim minority 
population in Sri Lanka is mobilizing around Islamism as a result of external actors 
promoting religious extremism. Limiting the impact of international influences is a 
challenge in addition to religious extremists of both Buddhist and Islamist parties in Sri 
Lanka. Thus, controlling the strong external Islamization process is important to ensure 
ethnic harmony in Sri Lanka. Because Sri Lanka’s progress as a developing democracy 
depends on the confidence of international diplomatic partners, identifying and rectifying 
the driving factors of religious and ethnic disharmony in Sri Lanka is of the utmost 
importance to the security and development of the country. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The longstanding harmony between the Muslim minority and Sri Lankan society, 
which dates to the late eighth century CE, has become fragile due to ethno-religious 
nationalism and Islamization in recent years. It is a distinct departure: When Muslims 
initially reached Sri Lanka from the Arabian Peninsula, none of the other ethnicities in Sri 
Lanka—the Sinhalese majority, Tamils, and Veddas—opposed the arrival and settling of 
Muslims in Sri Lanka; in fact, the Sinhalese majority welcomed Muslims and did not object 
to their settling in the island. Yet, with the arrival of external religious sentiments, starting 
in the 19th century, some disputes arose attached to religious identity and differences 
in religious practices that created a schism between Muslims and other ethnicities in 
Sri Lanka.  
After the long separatist war with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) 
ended in 2009, Sri Lankan Buddhist nationalists raised the alarm about the spread of 
contemporary global Islamization and related issues in Sri Lanka (for example, the rise of 
the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, or ISIS). The Buddhist nationalist rhetoric has put 
a certain pressure on Sri Lanka’s Muslims. At the same time, an increase of instrumental 
politics by Sinhalese, Tamil, and Muslim political leaders has ignited increasingly 
exclusive nationalism in the name of winning the popular vote in domestic elections. 
Furthermore, incentives from the Islamic world, including Iran, Qatar, Pakistan, and Saudi 
Arabia, have encouraged the Sri Lankan Muslims to pursue Islamization. Islamization 
espouses the standardization of civil society through strict devotion to religious observance 
of Islamic laws and construction of unique Muslim identity —almost all facets of human 
life are enforced by a stringent and inflexible set of religious rules and regulations.1 Thus, 
Muslims actively began to demand the application of certain external Islamic laws and 
practices in Sri Lanka.  
1 Peter G. Riddle, “Islamization, Civil Society, and Religious Minority in Malaysia,” in Islam in South 
East Asia: Political Social and Strategic Challenges in the 21st Century, ed. K. S. Nathan and Mohommad 
H. Kamali (Singapore: Institute of South East Asian Studies, 2005), 162–167. 
2 
While dominant Islamist demonstrations have not taken place in Sri Lanka, anti-
Muslimism sentiments and Islamophobia manifested in hatred and violence directed at Sri 
Lanka Muslims could spark instability in the island.2 This thesis considers how and why 
the growing Islamist extremism, as well as the rising Buddhist nationalism, are putting Sri 
Lanka’s security at risk.  
A. BACKGROUND 
The initial influx of Muslims into Sri Lanka consisted of transnational traders. 
According to Barbara Metcalf, Persian Muslims arrived in South Asian countries, including 
Sri Lanka, in the seventh and the eighth centuries for the spice-trade in the Indian Ocean.3 
The first permanent settlements of Muslim people appeared in Sri Lanka after the arrival 
of Ibn Battuta, a Moroccan traveler, in the 13th century CE.4 Some of the slaves, traders, 
and other travelers on Ibn Battuta’s ship stayed in Sri Lanka (then Ceylon).5 According to 
Argus Mohammad and Hussein Nordin, Muslim groups had settled in port-areas of the 
country and lived harmoniously within the communities.6 According to Amir Ali, until the 
Portuguese arrived in 1505, at Galle port city, the Ceylon Muslim community did not have 
any rivalry.7 On the arrival of Dutch in Sri Lanka in 1640, Muslims were chased out of the 
port areas for the spice trade monopoly, and some of them settled in the eastern part of the 
country.8 As Marina Ismile describes, Sri Lankan Muslims embraced a mix of Tamil and 
Sinhalese culture and created a unique Sri Lankan Muslim culture unlike the culture in 
                                                 
2 Robin Lewiston, “Sinhala Buddhist Nationalism and Islamophobia in Contemporary Sri Lanka” 
(Honors Thesis, Bates College, 2015), 126, http://scarab.bates.edu/honorstheses/126 
3 Barbara D. Metcalf, ”Sri Lanka and the Southern Coasts,” A Historical Overview of Islam in South 
Asia,1, http://assets.press.princeton.edu/chapters/i9061.pdf 
4 Ross E. Dunn, The Adventures of Ibn Battuta A Muslim Traveler of the Fourteenth Century 
(Oakland, CA: University of California Press, 2012), 241–250. 
5 Dunn, The Adventures of Ibn Battuta, 244–247. 
6 Mohammad Agus Yusoff, Nordin Hussin, and Athambawa Sarjoon, “Positioning Muslims in ethnic 
relations, ethnic conflict and peace process in Sri Lanka.” Asian Social Science 10 (2014): 199–211. 
7 Ameer Ali, “Political Buddhism, Islamic Orthodoxy and Open Economy: The Toxic Triad in 
Sinhalese–Muslim Relations in Sri Lanka,” Journal of Asian and African Studies 49, no. 3 (2013): 299, 
doi:10.1177/0021909613485708. 
8 Frank Broeze, Gateways of Asia: Port Cities of Asia in the 13th - 20th Centuries (London: Kegan 
Paul, 1997). 
3 
other Islamic countries. Muslims in Sri Lanka do not speak Arabic; for example, they speak 
Tamil or Sinhalese and do not practice extreme radical Islam, but remain followers of a 
moderate form of Islam.9 A healthy relationship formed between them and other ethnic 
groups such as the Sinhalese and the Tamils, marking a flourishing cultural, socio-
economic, and political landscape in Sri Lanka.10  
Sri Lanka gained independence in 1948, which was followed by the advent of 
ethnicized political affairs beginning in 1956.11 Under this system, Buddhist nationalist 
politicians gave priority to the Sinhalese language, and ignited ethnic riots especially 
against Tamils.12 Even then, Sri Lankan Muslims did not have an “ethnic problem” with 
the Sinhalese majority. Muslim and Sinhalese led riots in Puttalum in 1976 as a reaction to 
the removal of a Muslim, Badiuddin Mahmud, from the cabinet ministry and against the 
socialist economic policies of the government.13 Thereafter, no major disputes occurred 
until M.H.M. Ashraf came to prominence, demanding a power-sharing arrangement in 
1994.14 Ashraf and his followers wanted to establish an Islamic religious identity and 
application of Islamic practices in Sri Lankan politics; by the time of his entrance into 
religious politics, contemporary Muslim politicians did not use Islam or Muslim ethnicity 
for political purposes; thus, he exploited Islam to gain favor with Muslims.15  
9 Marina Ismail, “Muslims of Sri Lanka,” Department of Muslim Religious and Cultural Affairs,” 
2012, Accessed April 17, 2018, http://muslimaffairs.gov.lk/muslims-of-sri-lanka/ 
10 Mahinda Deegalle, “Politics of the Jathika Hela Urumaya Monks: Buddhism and Ethnicity in 
Contemporary Sri Lanka,” Academia.edu, 
www.academia.edu/960928/Politics_of_the_Jathika_Hela_Urumaya_Monks_Buddhism_and_Ethnicity_in
_Contemporary_Sri_Lanka 
11 Rapti Siriwardena, “War, Migration and Modernity: The Micro-Politics of the Hijab in 
Northeastern Sri Lanka” (Department of Political and Cultural Change, University of Bonn, 2014), 2. 
12 Zarin Ahmad, “Contours of Muslim nationalism in Sri Lanka,” South Asian History and Culture 3, 
no. 2 (March 2012): 270, doi:10.1080/19472498.2012.664435 
13 Ameer Ali, “Muslims in Harmony and Conflict in Plural Sri Lanka: A Historical Summary from a 
Religio-economic and Political Perspective,” Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 34, no. 3 (2014): 237, 
doi:10.1080/13602004.2014.939554. 
14 Mohammad Yusoff, Zawiyah Zain, and Athambawa Sarjoon, “Positioning Muslims in Ethnic 
Relations, Ethnic Conflict and Peace Process in Sri Lanka,” Asian Social Science 10, no. 10 (2014): 6, 
doi:10.5539/ass.v10n10p199. 
15 Vellaithambi Ameerdeen, Ethnic Politics of Muslims in Sri Lanka (Wattala: Kribs Printers (P) Ltd, 
2006), 106–110. 
4 
Despite threats from Tamil nationalists, Muslim political leaders gained an 
advantage through exploitation of Islam in politics, and sought to build their Islamic nation. 
The Singhalese and the Muslims in the East were targeted and harassed throughout the 
separatist war between the government security forces and the LTTE from 1982 to 2009.16 
According to Dennis B. McGilvray, Tamil extremists disrupted the Muslim population and 
evicted them from North.17 As an answer to the LTTE threats against Muslims, Eastern 
Muslim political leader Ashraf mobilized the Muslims around the religious polity of the 
Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC).18 Research by Athambawa Sarjoon and his 
colleagues, which examined the Muslim movement for territorial autonomy in eastern Sri 
Lanka, recommended that reforms should be established at the procedural and institutional 
levels to provide guidance, and to actively monitor the activities of religious groups, 
mobilizing groups, and even smaller collectives in an effort to maintain the ethnic 
harmony.19  
B. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
This thesis examines how and why Islamism is growing among the minority 
Muslim population in Sri Lanka. Driving this examination are two hypotheses: first, that 
the Muslim minority population is mobilizing around Islamism in reaction to growing 
Buddhist nationalism; and second, that the Muslim minority population in Sri Lanka is 
mobilizing around Islamism as a result of external actors promoting religious extremism. 
                                                 
16 Shantha Hennayake, “Sri Lanka in 1992: Opportunity Missed in the Ethno-Nationalist Crisis,” 
Asian Survey 33, no. 2 (1993): 158, http://as.ucpress.edu/content/33/2/157; A.R.M. Imtiyaz, “Conflict and 
Constitutional Solution in Sri Lanka,” Indian Journal of Asian Affairs 17, no. 2 (2004): 23–42. 
17 Dennis B. McGillivray, “Sri Lankan Muslims: Between Ethno-nationalism and the Global 
Ummah,” Nations and Nationalism 17, no. 1 (2010), 50–64, doi/abs/10.1111/j.1469-8129.2010.00460 
18 Ameerdeen, Ethnic Politics of Muslims in Sri Lanka, 106–110. 
19 Mohammad Yusoff, Nordin Hussin, and Athambawa Sarjoon, “Muslim Demand for Territorial 
Autonomy in Eastern Sri Lanka: An Analysis of its Origin, Development and the Present Stance,” Asian 
Social Science 10 (2014): 76–88, file://comfort/pfernand$/Downloads/ASSsecondarticle.pdf 
5 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The scholarly work on Buddhist nationalism and radicalization provides the idea 
that Buddhist Singhalese are radicalized and ill-treating other communities.20 At the same 
time, Islamization taking place in Sri Lanka is changing the Muslim society to a more 
radical path and alienating Muslims from Sri Lankan society.21 This thesis finds both the 
Islamization and Buddhist nationalist movements are becoming ever more radicalized and 
creating divisions in the Sri Lankan society. Within their radicalization process, Sri Lankan 
Muslims are responding to global Ummah (the concept of gathering all of humanity into 
one Islamic community) and adopting contentious attitudes to other ethnicities.22 Farhad 
Khosrokhavar points out that radicalized Islamist terrorism targets all who do not conform 
to the establishment of true Islamic global citizenship (which is Radical Ummah centered 
Islamism), and only true Muslims who accept their ideology are spared.23 When 
emphasizing Ummah, this movement directs Muslims and other minority ethnicities to 
submit to strict Islamic practices through enforcing dominant harsh and inhumane 
treatment such as killings and injuring any who refuse to do so. 
1. Radicalization
Radicalization has been defined in many different ways. According to Eitan Alimi, 
radicalization emerges from a process of “social movement-led episodes” of ongoing 
politics, and thereby, it is affected by the multifaceted and mutually reinforced rational 
dynamics in the process.24 These social movements are less organized sustainable 
campaigns that achieve common aims by pledging to maintain or conserve the communal 
20 M.A. Nuhman, “Sinhala Buddhist Nationalism and Muslim Identity in Sri Lanka,” in Buddhist 
Extremists and Minorities, ed. John Clifford Holt (UK: Oxford University Press, 2016), Chapter One. 
21 Amir Ali, “Wahhaby Threat to Traditional Cultures in the Sunni-Muslim World: A Neglected 
Theme in Cultural Globalization,” IRHSR: International Review of Humanities, accessed August 24, 2018, 
http://www.irhsr.org/papers/Feb2017-9.pdf 
22 McGilvray, “Sri Lankan Muslims, 45 
23 Farhad Khosrokhavar, Radicalization Why Some People Choose the Path of Violence (New York: 
The New Press, 2017), 68–70 
24 Eitan Y. Alimi, Chares Demetriou, and Lorenzo Bosi, “The Dynamics of Radicalization: a 
Relational and Comparative Perspective” (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 24–54.   
6 
values or by reforming the collective behavioral practices using different approaches. 
Khosrokhavar, referring to radicalization, provides that alienation from the dominant 
culture, joblessness, and discrimination in a marginalized community are the main causes 
of radicalization.25 People who have been incarcerated for minor crimes have often ended 
up being radicalized at the end of their prison terms because of their religious awakening 
during their incarceration.26 Feelings that develop through imprisonment, such as 
“uncertainty, perceived hostility, and perceived injustice,” are identified as the three most 
important overriding feelings and psychological factors that, when embraced by religious 
fundamentalism, create radicalization among Muslims.27 Maajid Nawaz similarly cites 
discrimination, ill-treatment, negative image, misunderstanding of Quran teachings, and 
extremist encouragement to violence as factors that bring Salafist radicalization.28 The 
Salafists are the Sunni Islamic revivalists who enforce the strict practice of Islam in the 
community, and this practice can grow into Jihadism.29 
2. Islamization  
Transnational religious communities in the globalized context pose a major issue 
in the literature review, along with the regional push and pull factors for radicalization and 
Islamization. According to Amir Ali, Islamization has nothing to do with extremism; it is 
only a strict adherence to religious practices.30 The process of Islamization in Sri Lanka is 
ensured by two main Islamic organizations, Tablgh Jamaat and the Wahhabi group 
                                                 
25 Khosrokhavar, Radicalization Why Some People Choose, 127–131. 
26 Khosrokhavar, Radicalization Why Some People Choose, 127–131. 
27 Maykel Verkuyten, “Religious Fundamentalism and Radicalization among Muslim Minority Youth 
in Europe,” European Psychologist 22, no. 3 (September 2017): 198–204, 
https://econtent.hogrefe.com/doi/10.1027/1016-9040/a000314. 
28 Majeed Nawaz, My Journey out of Islamism Extremism, (London: First Lyons Press, 2013), 65–70.; 
Majeed Nawaz, Salafist is an Islamic resistance movement that embraces extremist beliefs and inculcates 
radical ideas in Muslims.  
29 Andrew Wimhurst, “Nothing to Do with Islam: The Historical Origins, Ideology and Strategic 
Threat of Global Salafi-Jihadism,” Department of Defence, Australian Government, November 2016,1, 
http://www.defence.gov.au/ADC/Publications/IndoPac/Wimhurst_IPSP_Nov16_(updated).pdf. 
30   Ameer Ali, “Political Buddhism, Islamic Orthodoxy and Open Economy: The Toxic Triad in 
Sinhalese–Muslim Relations in Sri Lanka,” Journal of Asian and African Studies 49, no. 3 (2014): 311, 
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0021909613485708.  
7 
(Ummah Islamia/Thawheed Jamath).31 These groups have introduced political advisory 
mechanisms, Islamic banking and finance systems, Arab dress codes, marriage for 
underage girls, emphasis on Halal food, and intolerance of non-Islamic religious practices, 
all of which are the ingredients of Islamization in Sri Lanka.32 In comparison to recent 
Islamic politics in the world, Shmuel Bar argues that Islamic extremist leaders justify this 
fundamentalism through religious-centered ideologies and orientation.33  
In Sri Lanka, Muslim groups have always been allowed to express their religious 
views and follow their ethnic, cultural, and economic practices according to their religion, 
without any hindrance.34 Thilak Samaranayake discusses that the Muslims’ demand for the 
application of religious means to the legal system in Sri Lanka cannot be accepted, 
however, as these are not a guaranteed right for legal justice.35 Angel Rabasa defines that 
Wahhabism is the Islamic refining sector of Saudi Arabia, fathered by Muhammad ibn Abd 
al-Wahhab, and it conveys a strict Islamic fundamentalist interpretation of Islam.36 
Fundamentally, Wahhabis would require all Muslims to follow the strict practice of 
religious interpretation and subversive way of Islamists.37 The process of Wahhabism 
31 Ali, “Political Buddhism, Islamic Orthodoxy and Open Economy,” 311 
32 M. A. Nuhuman, “Ethnic Identity, Religious Fundamentalism and Muslim Women In Sri Lanka,” 
Women Living Under Muslim Laws, 1999, 4,5,6,7, 
https://scholar.google.com/scholar?hl=en&as_sdt=0%2C5&q=Ethnic+Identity%2C+Religious+Fundament
alism+and++Muslim+Women+In+Sri+Lanka++M.A.+Nuhuman&btnG= 
33 Shmuel Bar, “The Religious Sources of Islamic Terrorism,” in The Theory and Practice of Islamic 
Terrorism, ed. Marvin Perry and Howard E. Negrin (United States: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 11–20, 
doi:10.1057/9780230616509_2. 
34 Ameer Ali, “Islamic Revivalism in Harmony and Conflict: The Experience in Sri Lanka and 
Malaysia,” Asian Survey 24, no. 3 (1984): 303, 
https://www.jstor.org/stable/2644068?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents. 
35Thilak Samaranayake, “Understanding The Causes of The Sinhala-Muslim Conflict in Sri Lanka,” 
Colombo Telegraph, last modified May5, 2013, 
https://www.colombotelegraph.com/index.php/understanding-the-causes-of-the-sinhala-muslim-conflict-in-
sri-lanka/. 
36 Angel Rabasa et al., The Muslim World After 9/11, Project Air Force, Research Report (Santa 
Monica, California: The RAND Corporation, 2004), xx–xxii, 
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2004/RAND_MG246.pdf. 
37 Llyn P. Smith, “Islamic Ideology and Religious Practice Among ‘ Muslims in A Southern Sri 
Lankan Town,” (PhD diss., Department of Anthropology University College London, 1997), 163, 
http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/1317642/1/265119.pdf. 
8 
corresponds to the extremist ideology of takfir (“accusation of other Muslims as infidels”) 
and extremist religious intolerance toward other ethnicities or religions.38  
The rise of Wahhabism under the patronage of Saudi Arabian funds has become the 
main issue for divisions among ethnic minorities in Sri Lanka. Wahhabis in Sri Lanka 
propagate its expansion through the Thawheed organization.39 The teachings of the 
Wahhabi schools of thought depart from the conventional Quranic version, creating 
extremism and unrest.40 In 2014, the Sri Lankan police requested a restraining order to stop 
the conflicting groups, the Thawheed Jamath and Bodhu Bala Senawa (BBS), from 
demonstrating against one another; the Magistrate Courts Colombo granted the restraining 
order.41 This newly arrived Thawheed Jamaat preached Wahhabism, a different, and a 
more radical custom of Islam, which has pitted the primary schools of 
thoughtWahhabism, Sharia, and Salafismagainst the Sufism in Sri Lanka. The 
question remains whether the fundamental principle of submission to God and global 
Umah will mobilize the Muslims against other communities.42 
The literature also considers the sense of nationalism among the ethnoreligious 
groups that surfaced in the recent past as well as radicalization of Muslim groups in Sri 
Lanka. Mohamed Faslan and Nadine Vanniasinkam say that the motivations and functions 
of Islamic groups operating in Sri Lanka mainly stem from historical issues, ideological 
                                                 
38 Michael R. Dillon, “Wahhabism: Is it a Factor in the Spread of Global Terrorism?” (master’s thesis, 
Naval Postgraduate School, 2009), 
https://www.nps.edu/documents/105988371/107571254/DillonWahhabismThesis.pdf/23fc46fb-17a6-41da-
83b8-8e312191b5bb. 
39 Mohamed Faslan and Nadine Vanniasinkam, Fracturing Community Intra-group Relations among 
the Muslims of Sri Lanka, ICES Research Paper (n.d.), 14, 
https://www.scribd.com/doc/302814544/Fracturing-Community-Intra-group-relations-among-the-Muslims-
of-Sri-Lanka 
40 Rohan Gunaratna, “Annual Threat Assessment Global Threat Forecast,” Counter Terrorist Trends 
and Analyses, Journal of the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research 7, no. 11 
(January 2016): 72, http://www.css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-
studies/resources/docs/RSIS%20CTTA-January-2016.pdf  
41 Chaturanga Pradeep, “Restraining orders issued against demonstration in Colombo today,” Daily 
Mirror, August 13, 2013, 03, http://www.dailymirror.lk/article/restraining-orders-issued-against-
demonstration-in-colombo-today-51004.html. 
42 Emmanuel Karagiannis, “The New Political Islam | Emmanuel Karagiannis,” University of 
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disputes, global Islamization, and political motivations.43 Pakistan based Jamaat-e-Islami 
is considered the head of radicalized Islamic groups with branches in South Asia, including 
Sri Lanka.44 Tablighi Jamaat, which has been operating since the 1950s, has been exerting 
its extremist religious influences to enhance dawah (encouraging non-Muslims to convert) 
in Sri Lanka.45 It could thrust once hardline Muslims in Sri Lanka further into radical 
clusters such as ”Hizb ut-Tahrir and Jamaat-e-Islami” that emerged in the UK.46 Many 
scholars find that, other than during the Sri Lankan separatist war, only a few jihadist 
groups have operated in Sri Lanka, in the Baticaloa and Amparai districts.47 There are two 
major schools of thought in Muslim ideology in Sri LankaSunni Sufism and Shia 
Wahhabism.48 As per Djavad Nurbakhsh, Sufism can be understood as the individual’s 
appreciation of God through devotion to truthful, ethical, and mystic beliefs or qualities.49 
Wahhabism, on the other hand, claims to seek the purification of Islam by Sunnah and is a 
rigid practice of Sunni Muslims; Wahhabism delivers underlying ideological assistance for 
extremism. Nevertheless, although it does not have a sufficient mandate to justify violent-
radicalization in Sri Lanka, it does provide a hidden network of financial support to 
facilitate fanatic clusters expecting Islamization.50  
43 Faslan and Vanniasinkam, Fracturing Community Intra-group, 1,2, and 3. 
44 “Muslim Brotherhood and Jama’at-i Islami,” Pew Research Center’s Religion & Public Life 
Project, September 10, 2014, http://www.pewforum.org/2010/09/15/muslim-networks-and-movements-in-
western-europe-muslim-brotherhood-and-jamaat-i-islami/ 
45 “Sri Lanka: Colombo Orders Islamist Clerics to Leave,” Future Directions International, January 
28, 2016, www.futuredirections.org.au/publication/sri-lanka-colombo-orders-islamist-clerics-to-leave/. 
46 “Sri Lanka: Colombo Orders Islamist Clerics to Leave.” 
47 Sriskanda Raja, “Chapter Four, Unleashing Jihadism and Starving the Enemy,” in Government and 
Politics in Sri Lanka, Biopolitics and Security (New York: Routledge, 2017). 
48 Izeth Hussain, “A Case for Extirpating Wahhabism, Sri Lanka,” NewsRescue.com, last modified 
February 28, 2016, 4, https://newsrescue.com/a-case-for-extirpating-wahabism-by-izeth-hussain 
49 Djavad Nurbakhsh, “Sufism and Psychoanalysis Part Two : A Comparison Between Sufism and 
Psychoanalysis,” International Journal of Social Psychiatry, September 1978, 213, 
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Fear of increase in the Muslim population and possible future trends could damage 
the unity of the Sri Lankan community. Dr. Rohan Gunaratna has posited that minority 
discrimination is growing among the Sinhalese because the Muslim growth rate (1.9 
percent) finally surpassed that of the Sinhalese (1.1 percent) in 2012.51 Michel Breen 
projects that Buddhist domination over proponents of other religions stems from the fear 
of a diminishing Sinhalese culture that has seen Sri Lanka as the one and only Buddhist 
Sinhalese country in the world.52 Research by Robin N. Jones reveals that after the civil 
war, the groups of Muslim minorities became a focus of hatred and violence among right-
leaning Buddhist monks with underlying ethnoreligious motives.53 As Nils Gleditsch and 
Ida Rudolfsen explain, the rapid increase in human rights violations and Islamists armed 
conflicts have been expected all over the world, in Islamic countries as well as non-Islamic 
countries, compared to the previous years.54 The attempt of Buddhists for domination of 
Muslims needed to be refined as fear and reaction of growing Islamist violence and their 
strength. This fear is also not born in all Sri Lankan Buddhists as whole, but, a section of 
Buddhist activists associate the issue. Furthermore, literature will find the extent of 
implication of Islamism and extremist activities in Sri Lanka.  
Jones and John assert that the group of right-leaning Buddhist monks represents the 
fear that global forces could degrade Sinhalese ethnoreligious domination since the Sri 
Lankan Muslim community has connections to external Islamic power through religious 
bonds.55 The Muslim landscape has been changing over the last decade.56 According to 
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Nuhman, the fear built within the Sri Lankan Buddhist population of the Muslim group has 
remained firm, because the leadership of intellectuals in the Islamic community, and 
actively argued the significance of establishing their ethnic religious identities.57 Yet, as 
Animesh Roul explains, the death of Sri Lankan Muslims in Syria by airstrikes is the 
nearest example of the Sri Lankan Muslim community’s connection to ISIS and the 
outreach of the Islamic State into Sri Lanka.58 To resolve such misunderstandings and 
disproportionate fears requires an understanding of the perspectives of all sides has to be 
taken up at different levels without prejudice, but the most important objective is to identify 
how to preserve peace and stability in Sri Lanka at any cost.  
3. Growing Buddhist Nationalism in Sri Lanka 
Buddhist and Tamil nationalists want to maintain their majority as unique to them 
for their superiority in Sri Lanka for political gains.59 Andreas Johansson predicts that the 
Buddhist extremists need to secure Sri Lanka from foreign forces, particularly Islamists 
that change the country’s homogeneity.60 According to Tessa Bartholomeusz and Chandra 
De Silva, the Buddhist Sinhalese-Buddhist ideology seeks to control the profile of other 
racial and religious identities in Sri Lanka.61 Furthermore, Gunarthna, points to the 
uncompromising Sinhala Buddhists, who refer to the destruction of temples, and to the 
attacks and killings of Buddhist monks in Afghanistan by Muslims, as a way to justify their 
cause against Muslims in Sri Lanka.62 Neil DeVotta and Jason Stone describe that the 
Buddhist nationalism created by characters such as Anagarika Dharmapala and Venerable. 
Soma have inspired the monks to agitate against other communities.63 The opposing ethnic 
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parties in Sri Lanka mobilize against the majority Sinhalese due to the observance of 
Sinhalese communal political illustrations reinforced by Buddhist nationalism that has 
cultivated multiethnic political parties along majority and minority lines.64 Andreas 
Johansson’s Third Way offers the idea that the thinking of the Sinhalese is that “Sri Lanka, 
as a Buddhist nation, should follow the Buddhist way.”65 Just after the separatist war in 
2009 Sri Lanka, Sinhalese extremist Buddhist monks activated anti-Muslim campaigns that 
grew out of Islamophobia. Ven. Galgodaaththa Gnanasra led this Buddhist extremist group, 
the BBS.66 These scholarly perspectives provide the shape of Buddhist nationalism and its 
implications for the multiethnic environment. 
4. Muslim Radicalization in Sri Lanka 
The changing dynamics of religious beliefs, practices, and differences between 
Buddhism and Islamism create a rivalry in Sri Lanka. James Turner concludes that Islamist 
politics has the ability to disrupt countries with arguments about how religion is understood 
in relation to the political community, norms, and the conduct of affairs in the 
contemporary world.67 Thus, the justification of protecting the rights of Buddhists in Sri 
Lanka cannot be ruled out in association with notions that stir fear.68 With new technology 
such as the Internet and social media, the globalization effect has increased extremist 
tendencies and behavior among youths in the Muslim community.69 In the recent past, 
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extensive use of social media for global Islamist campaigns has been a common 
phenomenon in Sri Lanka.70 In referring to the SLMC as an Islamist party, Johansson 
describes them essentially as revolutionary radicals who seek change and challenge the 
governance, but he notes that some radical reformers enter the political stream.71 So, there 
is no clear-cut identification for radicals who operated in disguise when considering the 
Islamist activities in 2003, such as attacking innocent Tamils and own Muslims with 
different religious ideologies.72 According to Amir Ali, the Islamic revivalist drive in Sri 
Lanka is a contrast between “Iman-centered and Ummah-centered”; however, both the 
concepts are either radical or semi-radical.73 Further describing both paths Ali assesses that 
“Iman-centered [Islam is]: radical, fanatical, aggressive, and socially intolerant; and 
Ummah-centered: radical, politically militant, and socially divisive.”74 Thus, the 
movement has created a backlash in the form of a global requirement for a campaign 
against the Islamization of societies and the terrorist affiliates that continue to control these 
situations.75 
The literature describes different debates on religious differences that could assist 
in identifying the shortcomings of established ideas and could benefit the current situation 
in Sri Lanka. Faslan and Vanniasinkam represent the idea that “controversies are also a 
sign that Muslims are extremely pensive around their identity, origin, and religiosity. These 
efforts are not only driven by material gains, but also by the prerequisites of protecting 
global Ummah Islam.”76 
70 Ameer Ali, “Wahhaby Threat to Traditional Cultures in the Sunni- Muslim World: A Neglected 
Theme in Cultural Globalization,” International Review of Humanities and Scientific Research (2017), 99, 
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Bart Klem argues that ethnic war has contributed to Muslims seeking identity in 
paradoxical and divergent interpretations of Islam.77 During the civil war, the LTTE 
separatists in North and East Sri Lanka threatened the Muslim population who lived in 
northern and eastern coastal villages, forcing them to leave the areas.78 Since Muslims left 
those villages, different interpretations of Islam have interfaced with global Ummah and 
Islamist concepts and have been extended by interested political or religious parties to 
create cleavages among Muslims and within other communities in eastern Sri Lanka.79 
Two Islamic opposition groups clashing with each other to inculcate their ideologies and 
the strict opposition to building Buddhist statues in eastern Sri Lanka illustrate these 
cleavages.80 Klem explains that the avoidance of Muslim communities from active 
participation in the democratic process and the expression of political views will increase 
the radicalization process, which may end with clashes between communities and grow 
into terrorism.81 Moreover, in the case of Muslim youth in eastern Sri Lanka, if these 
homegrown issues continue, these young men may become radicalized, not necessarily to 
adopt Islamic fundamentalism but it may provide the inspiration.82 These claims define the 
political violence; the radicalized behavior of Islamist leaders with political agendas can 
destroy nation states.83  
 The radicalization of individuals or groups has many dimensions and factors; 
therefore, finding the solution to them is complicated in a multi-ethnoreligious 
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environment like the one in Sri Lanka.84 Ismail Jezima discusses that the Muslim people 
in Sri Lanka had maintained peaceful relationships and a sense of coexistence with other 
ethnicities in the country for centuries, and Sri Lankan Muslims supported the political 
leadership and trusted the rulers of the country.85 The Islamic polity that rejects the validity 
of a recent secular independent nation-state and establishes a pan-Islamic policy or renews 
a caliphate also emphasizes the violent bid to pursue political change.86 Traditional Islamic 
fundamentalism can be defined even more specifically as the will to have Sharia law and 
only Sharia as the law.87 According to Olivier Roy, the fact that constitutionally active 
Islamists cannot endure the suppressive control of state governance has driven many 
Muslims who are not relevant toward this increasingly nonpolitical and fundamentalist 
view.88 Besides this criticism concerning why radicalization or Islamization occurs, there 
is room for more explanation and definition of the phenomenon. 
Radicalization as the process by which individuals move from normal behavior, 
when simply holding radical beliefs escalates to the point of extremist ideology, and where 
Muslims at the upper end of this extremist ideology use it to justify violence to instigate 
social and/or political change.89 Furthermore, Fathali Moghaddam argues that the new age 
of globalization has created a situation of insecurity over the issue of religion and it has 
84 Upali Pannilage, “Globalisation and Construction of Local Culture in Rural Sri Lanka,” Sociology 
Study 6, no. 7 (July 2016): 457, 
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indirectly forced them to engage in radical, extreme behavior.90 Karen Keys-Turner’s 
research on the violent Islamic radicalization process proposes a framework for 
understanding this process, and identifies that radicalization could be minimized by 
developing a common understanding through proper informing, training, messaging, and 
engaging.91 Furthermore, it is important to understand that Muslims have been inspired by 
their unique religion to trust in Islam, to become “one who submits” (a Muslim), and so 
“one must accept the will of the one true God and the message of Muhammad, which is 
encapsulated in the shahada: There is no God but God, and Muhammad is His Prophet.”92 
Although Sri Lankan Muslims’ origins are closer to Tamil than Arabic, Muslim revivalism 
in Sri Lanka has encompassed a curiosity in Arabic relevancy for Sri Lankan Muslim 
community, and thus, it has amplified learning Arabic as the foundation for comprehending 
the Quran. These efforts have also emphasized the establishment of Islamic schools for 
Muslim children, which has further distanced them from other ethnicities.93 
D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
The growth in extremist or radical Islamic activities in the contemporary world has 
spread its tentacles into Sri Lanka. The Sinhalese fear for the moment centers on the image 
of contemporary Islamist issues in the southern Asian region.94 As the preceding literature 
review established, generalizing and associating Islam with terrorism is a way of 
reinforcing the notion that those Islamic extremist groups should be eradicated because of 
the violence they are perpetrating. Several arguments have stated that external Muslim 
activists who promote Islamist Sharia have influenced some Muslim and Sunnah 
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movements in Sri Lanka.95 The growth of Islamic extremism may have roots in the 
invasion of Islamist groups, under the cover of expansion of the religion. The underlying 
social motives in such activities seem to be due to grievances that express Muslims’ desire 
to become autonomous in certain areas of Sri Lanka. Thus, this thesis tests the hypothesis, 
Growing Buddhist nationalism has contributed to the Muslim minority population in Sri 
Lanka unifying around Islamism and external Islamist influences have contributed to the 
growing radicalization of Muslims in Sri Lanka. 
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis ranges over several subtopics: the background of the Muslim Sri Lankan 
population; Islamization in Sri Lanka; radicalization of Sinhalese Buddhist monk groups 
in Sri Lanka; and the influences of Muslim radicalization in Sri Lanka. This study builds 
on my 30 years of military experience in the northern and eastern parts of Sri Lanka, where 
the Muslim majority is settled. This survey also finds that scholarly publications such as 
“Sri Lankan Muslims: Between Ethno-nationalism and the Global Ummah” by Dennis 
McGilvray, which provide insight on the effects of global Islam, and the works of Bart 
Klem, can be considered as essential to this thesis because their sources confirm the interest 
of the majority of the population in Sri Lanka.96 Klem, in particular, has provided a 
comprehensive understanding of the underlying political and religious issues that drive the 
internal struggles of Sri Lanka Muslims.97 
 This research study follows the qualitative research method to analyze its data. I 
tried to avoid getting into a one-sided outcome by combining an equal number of 
publications from all four sides—the Muslim and Buddhist viewpoints, the common 
majority viewpoint, and the academic viewpoint. The paper compares multiple sources 
regarding the issues of radicalization, anti-Muslim sentiments, the growth of Buddhist 
nationalism, and the growth of Islamic extremism in Sri Lanka and its links to the south 
95 Athambawa Sarjoon, Mohammad Yusoff, and Nordin Hussin, “Anti-Muslim Sentiments and 
Violence: A Major Threat to Ethnic Reconciliation and Ethnic Harmony in Post-War Sri Lanka,” Religions 
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Asian region. Such comparison allows the creation of a further comprehensive output, 
assimilating the relevant viewpoints into one account. More specifically, this means that 
the paper concerns the external issues and recognizes the underlying factors pertinent to 
the combination of ideas. Consequently, the cultural, social, and political factors, and the 
interplay of such factors are considered when creating assumptions and conclusions 
regarding the issue. In order to effectively tackle and address the issue and its related 
concerns, it is essential to explore the history of the issue as well as the evolution of the 
relationship between the ethnic groups being studied. 
For a deeper study of the issue as well as its associated concerns, the paper examines 
different forms of sources. This thesis includes scholarly papers and articles to provide a 
historical account of the issues and to identify the historical relevance to certain 
contemporary factors. Furthermore, considering the impartiality of this paper, newspaper 
articles provide objective information as well as editorial opinion to assess the situation. 
Books that actively promote the theories and ideologies of the groups studied are taken into 
account in order to represent diversity in the perspectives being considered. A wider 
perspective allows the prevention of certain preconceived notions as well as innate biases 
towards certain groups. 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW AND CHAPTER OUTLINE 
The research is organized into four chapters. The first chapter offers the major 
research question, historic background, major literature review, including definitions of 
and background on radicalization, Islamization in Sri Lanka, and growing Buddhist 
nationalism in Sri Lanka, as well as potential explanations for and hypotheses related to 
the topic. Chapter I also describes the research design. Chapter II offers a discussion of 
how domestic factors influence Muslim mobilization in Sri Lanka. This chapter that 
discusses the history of Muslims in Sri Lanka, their settlement patterns, anti-Muslim 
sentiment, and their limited mobility. In addition to tracing the development of a Muslim 
political party, the chapter examines LTTE terrorism and its influences on the Muslin 
community, growing Buddhist nationalism. The origins of religious political parties in Sri 
Lanka and instrumental politics are considered, as are the effects of social media. Chapter 
19 
III discusses how the international factors are driving Muslim mobilization in Sri Lanka, 
through foreign financial aid, education, immigration and refugees, and how Islamic 
organizations have promoted Islamization in Sri Lanka. The final chapter presents analyses 
and provides conclusions with recommendations for further studies.  
20 
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II. MUSLIM MOBILIZATION IN SRI LANKA: 
DOMESTIC FACTORS 
This chapter discusses how the Muslim mobilization process in Sri Lanka took root 
in relation to domestic factors. The study focuses primarily on groups and individuals who 
arrived in Sri Lanka from different countries at various historical points. The chapter 
examines the indigenous factors that influenced the pattern of Muslim settlements in the 
multi-ethnic culture of Sri Lanka. Furthermore, to understand the present situation between 
Sinhalese Buddhists and the Muslims, the analysis highlights discrimination against 
Muslims and other hindrances to the social mobility of Muslims in Sri Lanka. While most 
Muslims are well integrated into Sri Lankan society, these impediments can loom large in 
any discussion of inequality or discrimination and, thus, merit further attention in these 
pages. 
A.  THE HISTORY OF MUSLIMS IN SRI LANKA 
The history of Muslims in Sri Lanka opens with the settlement of Middle Eastern 
traders in Ceylon in the eighth century CE.98 Early Muslims began to migrate across the 
world, following “the birth of Islam in Arabia [and] followed by the Persian military 
invasion, trade, pilgrimage, and missionaries.”99 According to Metcalf, the advent of 
Muslims in Sri Lanka begins with the exploitation of sea power in the trade expansion by 
Arab countries.100 According to Sri Lankan history, there were three main native ethnic 
groups who lived in Sri Lanka when Muslims came in eighth century: Sinhala, Tamils, and 
Veddas. The majority of the population was Sinhalese, the followers of Buddhism; Tamils 
were Hindus, and Veddas followed animism.101 Islam in South Asia reveals that the 
Muslims arrived in the South Asian region through the inception of trans-economic centers 
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in the Indian Ocean.102 Muslim traders, called “Moors,” arrived in Sri Lanka by the eighth 
century.103 The Arab sailors who passed Sri Lanka en route to far eastern countries stopped 
in Sri Lankan ports to resupply and to perform ship maintenance.104 Middle Eastern sailing 
ships also anchored in Sri Lanka to wait until the monsoon winds settled for sailing.105 In 
addition, the Dutch East Indian and British East Indian Companies brought south Indian 
Muslims (called Mohamedans) and Indonesian Muslims (called Malays) to the island after 
the 15th century for trade assistance, considering the trade connections that Muslims had 
with the Indian Ocean trade centers.106 
1. Muslim Settlement Patterns in Sri Lanka 
Scholars have recognized and distinguished the Muslim populations in Sri Lanka 
according to their origins, the different eras of their arrival, and their dispersal through the 
country.107 The earliest influx of Muslims came after the Sinhalese kings allowed some of 
the deportees of Medina in the eighth century (these Muslims were expelled by the fifth 
Umayyad Caliph Abdul Malik bin Merwan) to settle in Sri Lanka.108 In the 13th century 
CE, the arrival of Ibn Battuta also brought Muslims to Sri Lankan shores, and they settled 
in the country with the approval of Sinhalese kings. Ever since, there have been Muslim 
settlements established in Sri Lanka.109  
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  Smith, McGilvray and many other historians argue that Muslims initially settled as 
traders in harbor cities by establishing small societies.110 These Muslim settlements were 
allowed by the king and they were settled according to trade preferences; access to such 
trade goods as gems, ivory, pearls, or spices; and their own choice of place.111 Some Sri 
Lankan Muslims continued to trade in the ports, but many of them settled in rural coastal 
areas and started farming, fishing, and other occupations. As M.M.M. Mahroof discloses 
these Muslims ended up largely in “the sea-ports and coastal areas of the north, northeast, 
west and southern seaboard, viz, in Colombo, Jaffna, Mannar, Mantota, Puttalam, 
Trincomallee, Coodramalie, Barberyn, and Point-de-Galle (now Galle).”112  
According to Amir Ali, the initial wave of Muslims arrived in Sri Lanka with 
commercial rather than religious materials: “the religion of Islam and the Quran followed 
not the flag, but the weights and measurements of traders.”113 Although the earliest Moors 
in Sri Lanka did not propagate Islamic religious ideologies, they were believed to have 
been converted to Islam shortly after its rise in the Middle East.114 Furthermore, Ali 
illustrates that the advocates of Abbasid Caliph Bagdad emerged with Islamic teaching and 
beliefs in 940, spreading Islam among the Muslims as an expansion of the Caliph.115 The 
arrival of Islamic religion-centered ideologies and culture reshaped the local Arab 
merchant communities.116 Sri Lankans began to convert to Islam from the tenth century, 
but they experienced a dearth of religious teachers.117 At the time, Buddhist monks and 
other religious parties did not object to the arrival of Islam, the construction of mosques, 
and the propagating of Islam. Ali says of the spread of Islam in Sri Lanka: “Although Islam 
had fundamental theological differences with Buddhism, [due to] the attitudes, outward 
                                                 
110 Smith, “Islamic Ideology and Religious Practice,” 17, 49. 
111 Smith, 30. 
112 M.M.M. Mahroof, “Muslims in Sri Lanka,” 88; (The late M.M.M. Mahroof is a reputed scholar 
who carried out studies on Muslims, Muslim societies, Islam, and Islamic law, from 1967 to 2000.) 
113 Ali, “Muslims in Harmony and Conflict in Plural Sri Lanka,” 228.  
114 Smith, “Islamic Ideology and Religious Practice,” 24. 
115 Ali, “Muslims in Harmony and Conflict in Plural Sri Lanka,” 228.  
116  Mahroof, “Muslims in Sri Lanka: the long road to accommodation,” 87–89. 
117 Ali, “Muslims in Harmony and Conflict in Plural Sri Lanka,” 228. 
24 
appearances and the overall charisma, the two religions lived together with harmony.”118 
As per A.G. Zulkiple and M.I.M. Jazeel, although there were differences between the two 
religions of Buddhism and Islam, the Buddhists themselves broadly tolerated the 
outsiders.119 
Sri Lankan society and Sri Lanka’s Muslims, in particular, experienced Western 
colonial influences from the 15th to the 19th centuries due to its lucrative natural resources 
and its important strategic location in the sea lines of communication.120 The Dutch brought 
Muslims of Javanese origin as political convicts in 1658.121 These Javanese were expelled 
from Indonesia by the Dutch during their political and trade domination in Indonesia. 
Furthermore, some other Javanese Muslims (Malays) were brought to Sri Lanka by the 
British East India Company as soldiers for trade security in 1796.122 These Malays, too, 
settled in Sri Lanka and integrated with Sri Lankan society.  
2. Anti-Muslim Sentiment Begins  
The multiethnic harmony that had prevailed in Sri Lanka began to shift during 
colonial rule through the segregation of ethnicities, communities, and religious groups.123 
The peaceful coexistence ended in discrimination due to outside influences, fault lines 
among Sri Lankan Muslims, and through colonial forces. In the early 13th century, the 
Moors assisted a plunderer who came from Turkey to steal pearls and poach elephants by 
use of force in Chilow area.124 This incident led to the killing of the bandit as well as many 
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Moors who abetted the looting, by troops of King Parakrama Bahu; thereafter, a certain 
distrust of Muslims began to take hold. The Muslim traders had to give up their trade in 
the main ports when the Portuguese arrived in Galle in 1505, because the Portuguese started 
harassing Muslims over trade control.125 Muslims who performed well in trade were 
targeted and evicted from trading cities by the Portuguese.126 Portuguese anger with 
Muslims deepened because of their trade rivalry and the spread of Islam among Sinhalese 
Dawah (who attracted converts to Islam).127 The early Moors who settled in urban areas 
and closer to harbors had been totally driven out by the Dutch, who dominated the spice 
trade from 1640.128 Many of these desperate and displaced Muslims sought refuge in 
Batticaloa, Kalmunai, Trincomalee, etc., in the Eastern Province of Sri Lanka, and a few 
went deep into the countryside to places like Kandy and Kurunegala.129 In 1643, the 
Portuguese began persecuting Muslims in Colombo and Mathara, with killings, the burning 
of mosques, and the expulsion of 4,000 Muslims from trade cities.130 Subsequent to the 
Mathara riots, the Sinhalese Buddhist leader Senarath Konappu Bandara settled the 
refugees expelled by the Portuguese on the eastern coast.131 
Amid the discrimination and often persecution by colonial powers, Sri Lanka’s 
Muslims sought strength for their communities by allying themselves with the Sinhalese, 
which further underscored their integration into Sri Lankan society. During the Portuguese 
and Dutch period, Muslims counted as the rivals of the colonists in trade and religious 
missions; thus, they were oppressed.132 The Portuguese, in their own version of divide-
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and-conquer, also distinguished among the Moors, Indo Muhammadans, and Arab Shia 
Muslims.133 Still, the Sri Lankan Muslims ultimately and overwhelmingly embraced the 
larger Tamil and Sinhalese cultures and created a unique Sri Lankan Muslim culture.134  
After the Portuguese epoch, the British conquest began in 1796, and the Muslims 
and Sinhalese enjoyed different relations with the colonial rulers.135 British rule increased 
the arrival of Indian Muslim traders (Mohammedans) during the late 19th and early 20th 
centuries.136 In the event, the British gave more precedence to Indian Muslims traders, 
prizing particularly their assistance in trade expansion and the conquest of Sri Lankan 
rulers.137 Specifically, the native Muslims provided information to the British for capturing 
Keppetipola (District Head of Singhalese) of the last Sinhalese Kingdom in 1818. This 
episode became legendary as a grave offense done by Muslims against the Sinhalese 
nation, precipitating the rift between Sinhala and Muslim.138 The Muslims plot to provide 
secret information to the British enabling the latter to capture the Sinhalese leaders and the 
Kingdom of Kandy, cooled the relationship between the Sinhalese and Muslims—a 
division that the British continued to cultivate.139  
The trade agreements between the British and Sri Lankan Muslims sidelined the 
Sinhalese businesspersons, exacerbating the ethnic divide. Although Muslims controlled 
Sri Lanka’s external trade, the Sinhalese controlled the country’s internal trade.140 
According to Smith, “Muslims [who] dominated the main market in towns were granted 
special charters by the Kings,” and thus the Muslims had their trade freedom and gained a 
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monopoly.141 On the other hand, Smith notes “the Muslims who wanted to engage in 
interior trade needed the concurrence of Buddhist monks” because the monks believed that 
the encroachment of an alien faith would exacerbate the issues with Christianity that had 
already started spreading with colonialism.142  
Reference to ethnic and religious identities by Tamil and Muslim political elites has 
often formed social disputes in Sri Lanka. In an effort to unify the Tamil-speaking 
population in 1885, Sir Ponnambalam Ramanathan (a prominent Tamil nationalist political 
leader in the British Ceylon Congress) claimed to the Ceylon legislative council, “Sri 
Lankan Muslims are a group of Tamils who were converted to Islam and shared the same 
language and culture.”143 On the other hand, Arabi Pasa, a rebel Muslim nationalist exiled 
by British colonial power from Egypt, arrived in Sri Lanka in 1883144 proclaiming an 
Islamic religious identity distinct from Tamil ethnicity. His proclamation initiated a 
Muslim “identity crisis” (especially between Muslims and Tamils) as he sought to unify 
Muslim populations against the Hindu and Buddhist communities.145 With rousing Islamic 
teachings, Arabi Pasa inculcated the Muslims of Sri Lanka to stress their religious identity 
and ultimately to proclaim their identity as Arab Muslims (Moors) in 1888.146  
 The emergence of nationalism among ethnicities under British rule strengthened 
the ethnic identities in Sri Lanka. The continued peaceful appeals for a separate identity of 
Muslims soon descended into rivalry between Tamil and Muslim.147 In the 1880s, such 
characters as Muhammad Iqbal advanced Islamic voices and a growing nationalist sense 
of community with Muslims in India—against British colonial power.148 Similarly, 
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Ramanathan’s calls to form the Tamil-speaking population into one nation in late 1870s 
are considered as the beginning of Tamil nationalism.149 In turn, Muslim elites started 
expressing their religious identity in opposition to Tamil nationalism, while forming 
religious educational institutions and political elites in Sri Lanka.150 F. Zackariya and N. 
Shanmuganatham note that in 1905, Muslims even began to challenge the British legal 
structure to formalize their cultural practices. These demands included the implementation 
of Sharia law, which ultimately gained recognition in the legislature.151  
The Muslim domination of trade did not meet with particular Sinhalese objections, 
by contrast, until well into the colonial period.152 Trade domination by Mohammedan 
Muslims, Islamic revivalism, and ethnic differences under British rule worsened the 
Sinhala and Muslim relationship.153 Although there were disputes, the general rule was 
tolerance and accommodation in Sri Lanka until the 1915 uprisings of Muslims 
(Mohammedans) and Sinhalese.154 The riots in 1915 began with Mohammedans throwing 
stones at an annual Buddhist religious procession when it was passing by a newly built 
mosque in Kandy.155 According to Victor De Munck, thereafter the Sinhalese organized 
riots against Muslims everywhere in the country.156 The Sinhalese rioters targeted the 
South Indian traders because of religious conversions, Muslim revivalism, trade priority 
received by Muslims, and British encouragement of Islamic religious culture as an 
opposition to Buddhist nationalism.157  
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3.  Limited Social Mobility 
In 1885, the Muslim leaders began their social political process when they were 
included in the Ceylon Legislative Council by the British colonial rule in Sri Lanka. The 
Ceylon Legislative Council was established as a countermeasure when opposition arose 
among all ethnicities in Sri Lanka, demanding ethnic rights against the British ruler.158 The 
social and political organizations came together as the “Moors Union” on August 29, 1900, 
and as the “Ceylon Muslim Association” in 1903, uniting Muslims.159 These organizations 
were the foundation for the social, cultural, and political establishment of Muslims and 
demonstrated the freedom that they enjoyed in Sri Lanka.160 When the Ceylon National 
Congress was established under British colonial administration in 1919, several Muslim 
leaders were appointed as committee members, and TB Jaya became the Vice President in 
1925.161 The “increased number of educated Muslims and their rising economic status 
strengthened the shared Muslim identity in the country.”162 The Ceylon National Congress 
formed amid separate nationalist movements among Sinhalese, Tamils, and Muslims.163 
These significant events assisted the mobilization of Muslims as a nation and their identity 
became very prominent in Sri Lanka.   
The social and political affiliations—and discontents—among Sinhalese, Tamils, 
and Muslims in the nationalist movements carried through to the independence of Sri 
Lanka in 1948. Despite the fact that there had been unity among multi-ethnic political elites 
in achieving independence, by 1956 disparities began over the proposal to enshrine 
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“Sinhala as the only official language” in Sri Lanka.164 Buddhist nationalism, propagated 
by some monks and instrumental politicians, soon led to riots. This language issue created 
further divisions and led to nationalism among Tamil and Muslim political elites.165 
Furthermore, development projects conducted by the Government of Sri Lanka (GOSL) 
after independence introduced Sinhalese settlements in North and East crown lands, 
including the new irrigation project “Galoya” in 1953 in Amparai. Muslims saw these 
development projects as encroachment by the Sinhalese into Muslim areas.166 By the mid-
1970s, the Sri Lankan government enforced closed trade policies to minimize foreign 
exchange commitments, which restricted the entire trading community, but which most 
severely affected the Muslim traders.167 Again, it seemed to some Muslim Sri Lankans that 
official policy and even the law was designed to disadvantage them. 
B. MOBILIZATION SINCE INDEPENDENCE 
Sri Lankan Muslim political elites began to mobilize Muslims through Islamic 
politics against their challengers.168 Toward the late 1970s, a new, global Islamist revival 
began to reshape Muslim identity as “Ummah-centered”169 and Muslims became 
increasingly drawn to radical Islam.170 In Sri Lanka’s case, at the apparent cost of 
integration with global Islamism, the Muslim political elites started to advance by applying 
Islamic politics. This section attempts to explain the mobilization of the Sri Lanka Muslim 
Congress in the 1980s and the instrumental politics of the Muslim political elites. Finally, 
it traces how Muslims reacted to the internal tensions in Sri Lanka while addressing 
contemporary global Islamization. Muslims, in the face of political disparities with the 
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Sinhalese state, sought to emphasize their ethno-religious nationality in order to earn (or, 
in some cases, earn back) their socio-political status. Although the political situation was 
tense by the early1980s with the rise of the LTTE, the Muslims and Sinhalese communities 
had a close relationship, and they enjoyed their cultures and religions, while maintaining 
their ethnic identities in Sri Lanka.171 Indeed, Johansson states that Muslims never engaged 
in a separatist conflict as the Tamils did.172  
1. The Muslim Congress 
The foundation for mobilizing Muslims to seek autonomy developed through 
religious-based politics that began in eastern Sri Lanka.173 The conversion of nonpartisan 
religious institutions started in the early 1980s; and culminated in the birth of the Sri Lanka 
Muslim Congress (SLMC) in 1986.174 The SLMC began its political path as the symbol of 
the Tamil-speaking Muslim people in the Eastern Province.175 Furthermore, the SLMC had 
organized its campaign island-wide to mobilize Muslims in the same year. The SLMC 
initiated its journey from eastern Sri Lanka, the mostly densely populated Muslim 
community in the country, under the leadership of the late Mr. Muhammad H.M. Ashraf.176 
Such concerns as ethnic conflict, religious exposure, cultural differences, and self-
alienation have been the drivers of Islamic politics in Sri Lanka. The SLMC was formed 
to counter threats from the LTTE.177 Additionally, the SLMC served  to address the identity 
crisis felt by Eastern Muslims among Tamils, and to gain political advantage in eastern Sri 
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Lanka.178 Aside from this political mechanism, armed jihadist groups began forming, as 
Fara Mira explains, is response to the difficulties faced by Eastern Province Muslims in 
the face of LTTE threats during the separatist conflict in Sri Lanka (1989–2009).179 The 
jihadist groups formed throughout the Muslim community were used for protection by the 
Muslim community, counting as a deterrence against Tamils in Muslim and Tamil 
bordering villages. The LTTE’s strategic negotiator, Anton Balasingham, reported to the 
peace committee on Muslim jihadist operatives in 2001.180 M.H. Ashraf, as the SLMC 
leader, had cautioned the LTTE to stop ethnic violence; otherwise, he would convene a 
holy war with the full participation of jihadists.181 Srikahda Raja, confirming the presence 
of jihadists in Sri Lanka, notes, “Muslims armed themselves due to the suffering they 
underwent at the hands of the LTTE, not to oppose the government or to carve out a 
separate state.”182 Despite their stated purpose to provide Muslims from LTTE threats, 
these armed jihadist groups attacked and killed several innocent citizens, including 
Sinhalese and Tamils, in eastern Sri Lanka.  
By 1990, there were eight jihadist groups in Sri Lanka: Jihad group, Al Fata group, 
Sadam group, Osama group, Knox group, Mujahedeen group, the Jetty group, and the 
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Islamic Unity Front.183 The SLMC represented the savior of Islamic rights by stimulating 
Islamic identity, and that has become the strong appeal for religious unity. Stated in another 
way, it created greater challenges for other Muslims elites who enjoyed playing power 
politics with Sinhalese political parties.184 The Muslim leaders who worked with the 
Sinhalese majority political parties became unpopular among Muslims.185 The Muslim 
political leaders who affiliated with Sinhalese majority parties were considered as Kufirs 
or infidels by extremists. Johansson concludes, “SLMC politics arises from an antagonism 
between different nationalistic discourses and Islamism.”186 Fortunately, moderate Muslim 
political figures, according to McGilvray, were largely able to contain the armed violence 
of nationalists and Islamists.187 Nevertheless, Muslims lived in eastern Sri Lanka have 
mobilized their power through Islamization and spreading their Islamist views around the 
country.188 
 According to separate works by Andreas Johansson and M.A. Nuhman, the 
international revival of Islam in the 1970s gave rise to the highest appearance of Islamism 
throughout the world.189 Against this backdrop, the Islamic politics of the SLMC are 
clearly defined by its constitution as a process of inoculation of Muslim society and state 
governance with Islamic religious rules, aiming at “global Ummah” (universal Islamic 
polity). Thus, the SLMC mobilized Muslims for political gains by using religion and 
ethnicity.190 The use of ethnic nationalism in Muslim politics was a common phenomenon, 
but that was not the case for religious-associated politics in Sri Lanka. The SLMC marked 
the first such instance by affiliating Quranic-based politics with its party.191 Alternately, 
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Vellaithambi Ameerdeen argues that Sri Lankan Muslims regained the discrete social 
formations that they had lost in the colonial period by establishing SLMC.192 The SLMC 
structure has become an Islamic-based polity through institutions, such as establishing the 
authority of a majlis-i-shura (religious advisory council) for the resolution-making process 
through religious interpretations and the requirement that each party member follow Sharia 
law.193 Thus, the SLMC has extended the access of global Islamism to Sri Lanka’s politics 
through the majlis-i-shura, which is a member of the Arabic majlis-i-shura, and the 
legislative council for global Khalifa.194 
The SLMC based its political ideology on the Quran, Sunnah, and Sharia laws in 
Sri Lanka.195 Furthermore, the SLMC flag depicts “la ilaha illallah muhammadur 
rasulullah”196 meaning “for the name of Allah, we praise him, seek his help and ask for his 
forgiveness.”197 The connection between Islam, social behavior, and political behavior 
reaches back to the words of the Prophet Mohamed: “al-Islam din wa dawla” (Islam is not 
only a religion; it is also a matter of state governance). This means it has the control over 
governance.198 According to Jaydeva Uyangoda, grievances demanded Sri Lankan 
Muslims to mobilize; the SLMC, thus became supreme among minority political 
groupings—a political force perhaps even greater than the respective portion of the 
population made up of Muslims.199  
                                                 
192 Ameerdeen, Ethnic Politics of Muslims in Sri Lanka, 114. 
193 Johansson, “A Third Way,” 43.  
194 Mohammed A. AI-Muhanna, “The Saudi Majlis Ash-Shura: Domestic Functions and International 
Role, 1993–2003” (PhD diss., University of Durham School of Government and International Affairs , 
2005),211, https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/109008.pdf  
195 Ameerdeen, 114–117. 
196 Ameerdeen, 114. 
197 Ameerdeen, 113. 
198 Gudrun Kramer, “Islamist Notions of Democracy,” Middle East Research and Information 
Project, 183 (August 1993): 133, 
https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/3012570.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3Aa103692cfbd88c21db19d0d5cb8de22
7 
199 Jayadeva Uyangoda, “The Dynamics of Coalition Politics and Democracy in Sri Lanka,” Coalition 
Politics and Democratic Consolidation in Asia, 2012, 176, 
doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198079392.003.0004 
35 
McGilvray notes that Muslims who oriented themselves toward the global Ummah 
also distanced themselves from their Sinhalese and Tamil fellow citizens, creating 
tension.200 Similarly, Amir Ali opines that Sri Lankan Muslims were and are self-
alienating, due to their embrace of a foreign religious culture; they must decide whether 
they are Muslims who live in Sri Lanka or Sri Lankan Muslims.201 McGilvray further 
describes that the pan-Islamic influences for global Ummah further distance Muslims from 
the Sinhalese and Tamils.202 Islamic politics formed the SLMC and included the Islamic 
code of conduct in its political cause.203 The Islamic religious rule of “loving or hating 
Allah” has become a political concept for the SLMC to unite Muslims and adhere to 
religionist leadership.204  
2. Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE) 
The separatist LTTE became more active in the early 1990s, exercising terror 
against Sri Lankan Muslims, including some notorious massacres.205 On August 3, 1990, 
for example, the LTTE massacred 147 innocent Muslims inside the Kaththakudi Mosque 
while they were praying; on October 15, 1992, a separate incident took place at 
Palliyagodella, where the LTTE killed 285 Muslims.206 The power-sharing demands in the 
adjoining North and East provinces instigated a rivalry between LTTE and Muslim 
political leaders, which further divided the populations.207 Muslims in the East, who trusted 
the state government, remained with the government; other Muslims who did not have trust 
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in the state government joined the Tamil United Liberation Front (a Tamil political party), 
the Eelam Revolutionary Organization of Students (EROS), and ultimately the LTTE.208  
The LTTE targeted all political parties and populations who did not ally with them, 
especially those who were in the governmental and political mainstream.209 The Muslims 
had the leading businesses in most towns, limiting the Tamils’ capacity to engage in 
trading; for this reason, the LTTE intimidated Muslims.210 Tamils also protested that 
Muslims had intruded on their farming lands during the war and eventually forcing the 
owners to become laborers.211 Furthermore, the LTTE began agitating against Muslims 
because some of their number served in the Sri Lankan armed forces, especially as 
intelligence agents collecting vital information.212 Meanwhile, the Muslims who were 
living in southern India alongside Hindus, Christians, or Muslims were deemed as Indian 
Tamils, but with the growth of strict Islam among Muslims in Sri Lanka, wanted a separate 
identity from the Tamils; this division distanced Tamils and Muslims.213 Thus, Muslims 
who lived in the North and in the northeastern provinces felt the impact of the LTTE 
terrorist threat on their lives and properties in the late 1980s.214  
Ethnic cleansing of the Muslim population in the northern and eastern provinces by 
the LTTE mobilized the Muslims against the Tamil extremists. Specifically, the LTTE 
evicted the Muslim population from their dwellings in the North and the East, including 
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Jaffna; moreover, the LTTE carried out horrible massacres in Sammnthurai, Kalmunai, 
Palliyagodella, Kaththankudi, and elsewhere in Sri Lanka.215 Muslims, who were evicted 
from the North by the LTTE, were welcomed by the Sinhalese and accommodated them in 
their homes, gardens, temples, and schools wherever possible.216  
The decisions taken by SLMC leadership and their political elites with respect to 
the separatist terrorism were ambiguous and paradoxical. The SLMC leader A.H.M. Ashraf 
took different approaches to the LTTE threats against Muslims; first, he raised jihadism 
against the LTTE; second, while working earnestly with Sri Lankan government, he earned 
political power in the provincial council, and finally, he sought straight discussion with 
LTTE leadership.217 All the while, the LTTE’s indiscriminate attacks continued against the 
Muslims and Sinhalese who lived in the regions that bordered Tamil-populated areas, and 
so the Muslim political leadership demanded the establishment of self-security forces for 
Muslims, sanctioned by the Sri Lankan government.218 During 2001–2004, direct 
negotiations took place between the SLMC leader Ashraf and the LTTE leader 
Prabhakaran for power sharing. The negotiations also considered Muslim self-rule for 
Eastern Province, as well as SLMC demands for a separate entity in the international peace 
process, independent from government, which signified Islamic identity and autonomy.219 
Meanwhile, Buddhist nationalists saw these independent efforts as the second opposition 
arising against the nation state.  
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C. GROWING BUDDHIST NATIONALISM 
 The rise of Buddhism nationalism against external and internal forces was intended 
to  maintained a unified Sri Lanka. A growing sense of fear and eventual isolation led the 
Sinhalese Buddhists to go against the idea of cultural pluralism, propounding a nation in 
which being the majority was a way to become entitled.220 In other words, there emerged 
a distinct and muscular Buddhist nationalism. As per Umar Farooq, scholars have different 
interpretations of nationalism; it may be rooted in religion, language, or ethnic 
superiority.221 Out of these causal factors, ethnoreligious identity has been an overarching 
factor in creating nationalism in Sri Lanka.222 Stephen Berkwitz writes, “Buddhist 
nationalism has become articulated as a discursive program for religious, political, and 
cultural reform, against external forces that are commonly seen as threatening the integrity 
and survival of Sinhala culture and Buddhism in Sri Lanka.”223 Berkwitz describes 
Buddhist nationalism in Sri Lanka as a response to external issues affecting Buddhist 
culture—a partial analog to Muslim identity politics in Sri Lanka finding their impetus in 
external factors.224  
1. Origins of Religious Political Parties 
Buddhist nationalism responded to perceived threats against the Buddhist 
nationalist state, either global issues or domestic threats. According to Volker Grabowsky, 
Buddhism provides a basis of rationality for the nation-state, often against non-Buddhists: 
“Buddhism is the dominant religion in large parts of East, South, and Southeast Asia 
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including SL [Sri Lanka] [and] has played a crucial role in Asian nationalist movements 
against European colonialism and imperialism.”225 This role became more political under 
British rule, when Christian missionaries undertook to convert Sri Lanka’s Buddhists. 
After independence, the All Ceylon Buddhist Congress, which had been established in the 
colonial era, requested to restore the religious priorities that Buddhism had prior to the 
colonial era in 1951.226 Consequently, the implementation of new constitutions in 1972 and 
1978 gave Buddhism priority over other religions.227 Politics came to Sri Lanka’s Buddhist 
clergy by force during the war; the killing of 37 monks in Aranthalawa on June 2, 1987 
was one of many attacks launched against Buddhist monks by LTTE terrorists.228 On 
January 25, 1998, the LTTE carried out a truck bomb attack in the Dalada Maligawa, the 
Buddhist temple of tooth relic making Buddhist monks more responsive. By 2004, Sri 
Lanka witnessed the radicalization of a vocal subgroup of Buddhist monks. Specifically, 
some radical Buddhist monks’ inaugurated “Jathika Hela Urumaya” (the National Heritage 
Party, or JHU) with a platform that argued, “Minority rights threatened the interests of the 
Sinhalese-Buddhist majority community and unitary state.”229 That year, ten monks 
became Members of Parliament.230 Furthermore, the negative image of Buddhist monks, 
created through the demonstrations staged by young Buddhist monks against Sri Lankan 
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campus authorities, persisted toward all monks.231 Despite this, until the end of the 
separatist war in 2009, radical Buddhists monks were not seen rallying against Islamists in 
Sri Lanka.232  
2. Instrumental Politics 
Only after the war did Sri Lankan Buddhist nationalism acquire the more or less 
open anti-Muslim stance that is associated with Buddhist nationalism in such other places 
as Myanmar. A faction separated from the JHU party, calling itself BBS, which was led by 
Galagoda Aththe Gnanasara, a radical Buddhist monk.233 He had headed anti-LTTE 
movements during the separatist war and launched its anti-Muslim campaign in 2012.234 
In addition, another Sinhalese Buddhist organization, Ravana Balaya, also promoted anti-
Muslim sentiments.235 Although these monks insisted that they challenged global political 
Islamism, they represented the local and national agendas of instrumentalist nationalist 
politicians.236 Ranjith Devasisri argues that all these monks and Sinhalese Buddhist 
organizations are politically motivated and backed by previous government leaders and 
their politicians who manipulate the monks and their platform as political instruments.237  
The instrumental politics of the previous government allowed BBS to clash with 
the Muslim community. The BBS challenged the use of abaya, the Halal certification of 
foods, and encouraged people to refuse to shop in Muslim owned enterprises in Sri 
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Lanka.238 The implementation of the Arabian dress code (hijab, Niqab, and burkar) for 
women is considered in most Western countries to be part of the Islamization process, and 
some countries have banned it.239 In contemporary Sri Lanka, Buddhist nationalists have 
challenged this style of dress that conceals the whole body from top to bottom, and enables 
an individual to avoid security checks. Furthermore, the BBS instigated the idea that 
concealing Muslim women from head to foot is an introduction of Islamist culture by 
foreigners and represents the early signs of radical Islam spreading in Sri Lanka that will 
change indigenous Islamic practices.240 In 2014, this conflict spread all over the country, 
especially in areas such as Aluthgama, Beruwla, Kaluthara, and Kandy. In this connection, 
the U.S. State Department reports, “BBS extremists attacked and assaulted civilians and 
members of religious minorities and burned their property and riots started by the BBS 
resulted in at least three deaths.”241 On June 12, 2014, these riots began in Beruwala and 
Aluthgama as a response to Muslim youth insulting and assaulting a Buddhist monk in 
Darga Town Kaluthar, a Muslim populated area.242 Although police arrested the three 
suspected Muslim youths, the protest began as a response to the incident and escalated into 
a riot, killing three people, damaging houses, shops, and displacing both Sinhalese and 
Muslims (8,000 and 2,000), respectively.243 Furthermore, in contemporary Sri Lanka firm 
beliefs and practices have mirrored the growing radical Islamization process conducted by 
radical Islamist organizations and contributed to these incidents.244  
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3. Social Media 
BBS associates, as well as Islamist groups, have used social media such as 
Facebook to spread information that has created divisions between the ethnicities in Sri 
Lanka.245 According to Athambawa Sarjoon, Mohammad Agus Yusoff, and Noordin 
Hussin, there were a series of attacks on Muslim religious places in the year 2012 that were 
propagated and mobilized through social media by BBS.246 The BBS has extensively used 
Facebook as their platform to spread global radical Islamist videos to spark Islamophobia 
among Sinhala Buddhists, which motivated Sinhalese against Muslim radicals.247 The 
latest clashes occurred between Sinhalese and Muslims in Kandy on March 8, 2018, 
following a road assault incident.248 Following the assault, a Sinhalese youth died after two 
weeks of treatment at the hospital. The Facebook communications, which Buddhist monks 
were suspected of propagating subsequent to the death, escalated the riots in Kandy, with 
Sinhalese burning and vandalizing Muslim shops and houses. Ultimately, the Sri Lankan 
government blocked social media, including Facebook, to control the situation.249 The 
Sinhalese riots ended with further death on each side, bringing the death total to threetwo 
Buddhist Sinhalese and one Muslim.250  
D. CONCLUSION 
 The progressive integration of Muslims in Sri Lankan society had many cultural, 
economic, and political fault lines, formed by ethno-religious factors that shaped a 
fractured Sri Lankan community. The strict code of foreign Islamic affiliations combined 
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with these factors to mobilize and unite a growing Muslim population in Sri Lanka. These 
changes developed into a behavioral pattern of Muslims and constituted a schism among 
ethnicities, enabling extremist ideologies to enter Muslim society. Along these lines, such 
radical ideologies mobilized Buddhist nationalists and Islamist groups against each other. 
Certainly not all Muslims and Sinhalese have embraced extreme ideologies. Nevertheless, 
ethno-religious politics threaten multi-ethnic harmony in Sri Lanka. These issues have 
typically extended the distance between Sinhalese and Muslims, and between Muslims and 
Tamils; furthermore, these issues have destabilized the political structure and exacerbated 
the ailing economy—which not only feeds more domestic extremism but also has paved 
the way for foreign actors to influence the Muslim community.  
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III. MUSLIM MOBILIZATION IN SRI LANKA: 
INTERNATIONAL FACTORS 
This chapter identifies the international influences on the Muslim community in Sri 
Lanka. Further, it examines how foreign actors acquire and retain access to the community 
through various organizations. Ultimately, this chapter finds that this foreign involvement 
has activated the Muslims in Sri Lanka through the Islamization process to mobilize against 
other communities. According to Klem, Islamization in eastern Sri Lanka emphasizes 
Islamist politics through religious revivalism, which has already created rivalries among 
Muslims, as well as with other ethnicities. Armed Islamists, in particular, can be seen as 
jihadism.251 The presence of active Wahhabi groups from outside Sri Lanka and other 
armed religious groups have further extended the Islamist discourse within the boundaries 
of Kaththankudi,252 the most densely Muslim-populated village (of approximately 600,00) 
that has been affected by external Islamist influences (Sunni and Sufi/Shia Islamists) in 
eastern Sri Lanka.253 This chapter explores the economic connections, social and religious 
organizations, and political groupings that, together, effect this foreign influence in the 
name of Islamic unity. 
Over time, the influences of Islamization have prevented Muslim students from 
expanding their knowledge of science, math, and technological studies.254 The teaching of 
Arabic, Islamic-oriented studies, and radical Islam with different Quranic interpretations 
in madrassas has led to feelings of isolation among Muslim students in society and has 
inculcated radical Islamic ideas.255 In 1982, the dress code of Gulf countries, which was 
not a practice of Sri Lankan Muslims, was adopted, and the hijab (headscarf) and head caps 
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were formally announced as part of the school uniform for girls and boys in eastern Sri 
Lanka.256 Arabic and Islamic education reforms by Muslim elites, based on Pan Islamic 
influences, prevented Muslim students from exposure to general education, whereas 
Sinhalese and Tamils had their education in English and had the opportunity to study 
technology and science.257 There were more than 205 Muslim private madrassas registered 
for teaching Arabic and Sharia law by 1999, and the All Ceylon Jammiathul Ulama (the 
Islamic religious body of theology) continues to prepare the teaching guide and syllabus 
for Arabic colleges in Sri Lanka.258 There are more than 1,000 government schools 
designed for Islamic, Quranic, and Arabic education, including 751 pure Muslim schools. 
State testing is carried out for all three levels in the Sri Lanka education system common 
to all ethnicities.259 Furthermore, all Sri Lankan universities that have religious faculties 
include a separate Islamic faculty.260 Ranga Jayasuriya, a journalist and international 
politics scholar, has reported that the young Mawlawis, who returned after their studies in 
Pakistan and the Middle East, not only campaigned for a radicalized Salafi path for 
Muslims in Sri Lanka, but also built new mosques all around the country under Gulf donor 
projects, and these mosques are serving as madrassas.261 
A. FOREIGN ECONOMIC FACTORS 
Foreign economic assistance has mobilized the Muslim community with 
implications for growing Islamization through ethno-religious nationalism in Sri Lanka. 
This section refers to the elements of Islamization in an Islamic state that have appeared in 
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the recent past in Sri Lanka—including an Islamic form of  finance, Islamic law, Arabic 
Islamic education, open clashes over Islamic theological beliefs, and Islamic religious 
practices inculcated by external religious teaching. The modern phenomenon has at least 
half a century of history: foreign financial assistance for Islamization in early the 1950s 
established youth movements aimed at global Ummah through teachings of Al Quran and 
Sunnah.262 Donor countries like Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Iran, Turkey, and Qatar regularly 
provide financial assistance to Sri Lankan Muslims—with certain strings, or at least 
expectations, attached, specifically organization promoting the religion.263 Amir Ali, 
explaining the implications of Middle East funding for the propagation of Islamization, 
says that “petrodollars bring the passion of activities of Islamizing economic and political 
proportions in Sri Lanka” similar to other Islamic countries.264  
1. Foreign Aid
This foreign finance has literally changed the social behavioral setting of the Sri 
Lankan Muslim population. Meghan O’Sullivan states that Sri Lankan Muslims were 
embroiled in the Islamic revival process through funding from the Islamic world.265 For 
example, Iraqi financial assistance approved for flood relief in 1978 was utilized to build a 
village, including 100 houses and a mosque; the so-called model village was named for 
Saddam Hussein.266 As the initial step, the Muslim political elites influenced the 
government to established separate funds for the Muslim community through a mandatory 
deduction of 4 percent from wages of Muslim government servants. Later these Muslim 
political elites, led by M.H. Mouhammed and A.C.S. Hameed, managed to convert the 
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funds into direct Arab nation funds, while the contributions of government servants 
continued to improve regularly.267  
After 2004, development projects conducted in Kaththankudi with Saudi Arabian 
funds rebuilt the town in the image of an Arabian village.268 Specifically, Kaththankudi 
now has permanent gateways on all road access points, symbolizing borders to the 
village.269 Within these boundaries, Islam (Sunnah and Sharia) predominates,270 and strict 
local rules prevent other ethnicities from living there—the elements of Islamization.271 
Similarly, in 2017, Qatar completed a housing project exclusively for the Muslim 
population in Mannar district, which included 150 houses as well as religious and 
educational facilities.272 The exclusion of non-Muslim Sri Lankans from these 
improvement projects itself represents a step away from multi-ethnicism.273 It also may lay 
the foundations for undue Islamist influence in these regions of Sri Lanka. In 2017, a Qatar 
non-governmental organization (NGO) “the Foundation Sheikh Ibn Abdullah for 
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Humanitarian Services” built the biggest mosque in the North Eastern Province of Sri 
Lanka and another village consisting of 200 houses and a mosque in 2012.274 These 
continuous funding efforts from the Islamic world are mobilizing the Sri Lankan Muslim 
community toward strict Islamist religious practices.  
Although today Islamist organizations often mischaracterize themselves as welfare 
organizations in Sri Lanka,275 most of them are the very same organizations that RAND 
Europe identified as funding Islamization in the Netherlands.276 For example, the Saudi 
Arabian-funded NGO Al Haj Adul Jawad Alim Valiyullah Trust was registered in the year 
2009 as an official donor trustee to handle all the direct foreign financial funds aimed at 
developing the Islamic community in Sri Lanka.277 Yet, this organization had worked 
earlier—without an official capacity—to propagate Islamization by providing monetary 
and material benefits to poor Muslims in Sri Lanka, using welfare activities to promote 
Islamic separatism.278 P.K. Balachandran figures that such organizations as the Saudi-
funded Centre for Islamic Guidance, established in the early 1990s, are sowing 
Wahhabism.279  
Such scholars as Amir Ali insist that Saudi Arabian Wahhabism in Sri Lanka is 
neither Islamist politics—say, equivalent to ISIS, Al-Qaeda, or Taliban—nor the agency 
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or even evidence of Islamization.280 Nevertheless, because Wahhabism dictates extreme 
religious practices that have not previously existed in Sri Lanka,281 such as piety banking, 
application and enforcement of Sharia law, Tawhi Jamaat and Tabligi Jamaat, it depicts the 
Islamization process. Furthermore, Saudi Arabian money promotes Wahhabism among 
Muslims in Sri Lanka. This effort is achieved through their dedicated media including 
“Darussalam Global Publishes,” printed handbills, and newspapers dispensed via island-
wide mosques; these efforts have indirect and direct influence in the Islamization effort.282 
As O’Sullivan found in her research, the externally employed Moulavis (honored Islamic 
scholars or Ulama) are paid by Saudi Arabia, and they have been employed in Sri Lankan 
mosques to preach according to Middle Eastern practices.283  
There seems to be something of an arms race for sowing Islamization between Iran 
and Saudi Arabia, both of which use extensive financing to promote strict Quranic practices 
and values among local Muslim populations in South Asia and South East Asia.284 Most 
of these aid programs invest money without any formal agreements and do not have 
accountability or transparency. Several such organizations are at work in Sri Lanka today. 
For example, the Saudi Arabian funded Al Huda (The Correct Path) International Welfare 
Foundation operates in Sri Lanka, notably to finance the building of many madrassas.285 
Al Huda was founded by Farhat Hashmi, a Pakistani and former Jamaat-e-Islami activist 
with clear extremist proclivities.286 Furthermore, since 1994 Al Huda funding for Muslims 
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has encouraged Sri Lankan Muslims to deal exclusively within the community, including 
trade, Islamic piety banking, and insurance schemes for Muslims in Sri Lanka.287  
Sri Lankan politicians are often unable to enforce the law in the face of massive 
foreign financing. For example, in 2015, a Saudi-funded development in Wilpaththu 
National Park was approved by issuing a special government note (which delegated official 
authority using executive powers), which is illegal.288 The forest sustained significant and 
permanent devastation in the process.289 Even ancient Buddhist relics in Deegavapiya were 
bulldozed to make way for the construction of 500 houses by Saudi Arabia for people 
displaced by the tsunami in the East.290 Despite a restraining order, the houses were 
distributed among Muslims in 2018.291 Saudi Arabia executes direct funds through loans 
for the development of important infrastructure as well.292 In the face of such economic 
advantage, the Sri Lankan government cannot effectively stop these Islamic isolationist or 
separatist settlement programs.293  
The external forces of Islamic politics capitalize on every aspect of Sri Lanka’s 
economic situation. For example, Sri Lanka mostly relies on remittances from nationals 
employed overseas—overwhelmingly in Middle Eastern countries. There are nearly a half-
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million Sri Lankans working in Saudi Arabia alone.294 Similarly, famous Ceylon tea forms 
one of Sri Lanka’s major exports, also in exchange for Middle Eastern oil,295 making 
Colombo sensitive to issues of concern to these states and their populations, including Sri 
Lanka’s Muslims.296  
2. Social and Religious Organization 
Reviving religious-cultural traditions through Arabic education has become 
fundamental to Muslim identity in Sri Lanka. Sri Lankan Muslims used Sinhalese and 
Tamil as their languages until the 1890s.297 To teach Islam, even the Holy Quran was 
translated into Tamil and Sinhalese, as there was little use of Arabic among the Muslim 
population.298 Initially, imams from Turkey and Egypt were sent to expand Islamic 
education in Sri Lanka in 890’s.299 After Arabi Pasha’s arrival and the advent of revivalism 
in Sri Lanka, however, Islamic educators began to promote, and then demand, the use of 
Arabic.300 The Arabic emphasis on Quranic studies spread to schools in Sri Lanka by the 
end of the 19th century.301 In the recent past, the emphasis on Arabic or Islamic dress code 
has increased among the Sri Lankan Muslim women. These dress codes and other gender-
based controls promoted by social movements and mosques have prevented Muslim 
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women from social interaction with other communities.302 The ensuing Arabic and Islamic 
education reforms prevented the exposure of Muslim students to general national 
education, where Sinhalese and Tamils had their education in English.303 The 
differentiation of Sri Lanka’s Muslims, which served British political aims at the time, 
presently became one of the bases of Islamist social and religious separation.304  
3. Immigrants and Refugees 
Illegal and atypical immigrants became a threat to Sri Lanka with the rise of 
Islamist religious extremism. In contrast to the centuries of tolerance and mutual 
accommodation, the recent Muslim refugees from Pakistan, Afghanistan, Myanmar, and 
Maldives are seen as a greater threat to Sri Lanka because of the advent of contemporary 
Islamist terrorism in the world;305 Sri Lanka is particularly sensitive to terrorism threats 
since the recently ended war.306 In 2014, the Department of Immigration and Emigration 
in Sri Lanka reported an increase of asylum seekers and refugees, 1,562 and 308, 
respectively to the handful of refugees in previous years, because of the conflicts between 
Sunni and Ahmadiyya Islamic sectors in Pakistan and Afghanistan and Buddhist radicals 
and Muslims in Myanmar.307 These events have created an influx of Pakistani and 
Afghanistani nationals, including Sunni Muslim refugees, in Sri Lanka from 2007 to 2014, 
particularly in the Puttalum and Negombo areas.308 To control the situation, the 
immigration authority stopped the on-arrival visa entry process for Afghan and Pakistani 
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immigrants to Sri Lanka in 2014.309 Muslim refugees were seeking asylum in Sri Lanka or 
waiting to reach other destinations for asylum; however, few of them were deported using 
diplomatic assistance from Pakistan.310 Some radicalized Buddhist monks and nationalist 
politicians, like Udaya Gmmanpila (leader of Pivithuru Hela Urumaya), have protested 
against admitting refugees, stating that they would have come with predisposed hatred 
against Buddhists given their previous experiences in Myanmar.311 
Meanwhile, Sri Lankan defense authorities and the immigration department 
suspected that ISIS radical Islamists from Pakistan and Afghanistan had used Sri Lanka as 
a conduit to enter Syria and Western countries.312 Moreover, Turkish embassy sources 
reported that a group of 16 Sri Lankan Muslims, who joined ISIS headed by Abu Suayah 
al Silani, (a Sri Lankan ISIS leader who died in an airstrike in 2015), arrived in Syria in 
December 2014.313 Adding to this fear was the fact that a Lakshar-e-Taiba member, Mirza 
Himayat Baig, who was convicted for a bombing in a German bakery in Pone India in 
2011, injuring 64 and killing 17, had planned the attack and trained to make IEDs in Sri 
Lanka.314 On August 31, 2018, Australian police arrested a Sri Lankan Muslim suspected 
as an ISIS member and charged him with planning a series of terrorist attacks in 
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Australia.315 The investigation centers on the connections with other parties who assisted 
him. These events have kept Muslims under suspicion for aiding and having connections 
with Muslim extremism outside of Sri Lanka.  
B. ISLAMIC EDUCATION 
Islamic education in Arabic was new to Sri Lanka’sMuslims and to the state’s 
education system. This trend was established in the past and continues to date. In the past, 
Muslims began with learning the English, Tamil, or Singhalese language; later on, once 
they established themselves in Sri Lanka, they resisted learning in these languages and 
instead enlisted imams from the Middle East, India, and Malaysia, according to their 
needs.316 They wanted to establish an education system that would prevent Muslims from 
being baptized as Christians or becoming Hindus. Under the leadership of revivalist Siddi 
Lebbe, Islamic education was introduced for the Muslim population.317 Arabic Islamic 
education have inculcated religious-cultural traditions of Muslims and changed their 
behavior to shape Islamic identity in Sri Lanka. 
1. Madrassas in Sri Lanka 
External Islamic influences have driven the opening of madrassas to teach Arabic 
and Islamic culture in Sri Lanka. In 1892, an Egyptian assisted in the creation of Zahira 
Madrassa (present-day Zahira College of Colombo) for teaching Arabic and Islamic 
education; this marked the establishment of Islamic Schools in Sri Lanka. Subsequently, 
Arabic, Quranic, and Sharia education have become more rigorous in contemporary Sri 
Lanka.318 Baduidin Muhmud (a Muslim politician who worked with Sinhalese majority 
governments) became the education minister for two terms from 1970 to 1977, he himself 
and Mr. Dhahanayake (a Sinhalese politician) enhanced the Arabic and Islamic education 
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to greater extents, and even they allowed external Mawlawis in Sri Lanka.319 Baduidin 
Muhmud, as a student at Aligarh University had met Muslim nationalists such as Moulana 
Shaukat Ali, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, and Mohammad Iqbal, many others who involved in 
establishing the Islamic State in Pakistan, and Buduidin Muhmud was inspired himself for 
Islamic religious nationalism in Sri Lanka, which led to his removal from his ministerial 
appointment.  
The curriculum of the madrassas promotes the Islamic way of life, Islamic religious 
matters, Arabic, Islamic dress codes, and less formal education.320 By the end of the 19th 
century, Arabic and Quranic lessons were part of the Muslim school curriculum in Sri 
Lanka.321 Other than promoting loyalty to Islam and religious observance, all levels of 
Saudi Arabian education in Sri Lanka contribute to enforcing Sharia, denouncing other 
religions, and inculcating contradictory ideas through strict religious interpretations, such 
as encouraging fighting the enemy to establish Tawhid (one God for everyone).322 These 
Islamization influences have prevented the Muslim students from expanding their 
knowledge of science, math, and technology.323 Teaching of Arabic Islamic-oriented 
studies and radical Islam with different Quranic interpretations in madrassas, as well as 
their lack of exposure to general education, have led to feelings of isolation in Muslim 
students in relation to Sri Lankan society—this is because of their failures in academics, 
thus inculcate radical Islamic ideas.324  
Externally funded madrassas are partially responsible for teaching and spreading 
Islamic fundamentalism in Sri Lanka. The external funding for the spread of Wahhabism 
through the Islamic education system in Sri Lanka has anticipated shaping religious, 
political, social, and economic arenas toward Islamic polity. According to Michaela 
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Prokop, Saudi Arabian institutions provide financial assistance when they see the need of 
funds for education in other countries, and they involve condemning Shia and Sufi 
beliefs.325 The external influences that are interested in the use of Arabic language among 
Sri Lankan Muslims are conducting scholarly evaluations.326 According to former Sri 
Lankan Defense Secretary, most of the schools registered for Islamic and Arabic education, 
both private and government institutions, spread Saudi Arabian Salafist-Wahhabi 
fundamentalist ideas of contemporary radical Islam, which destroys the ethnic harmony in 
Sri Lanka.327  
As an example of the spread of Salafist-Wahhabism, Maulavi Inthikab disclosed in 
a speech that Islamic teaching has included different interpretations rather fundamentalist 
practices and promoting radical Islam at Ilma International Muslim Girls College.328 In his 
speech, he refers to the foreign Islamic preachers who visited the school to conduct radical 
fundamentalist lectures. Moreover, the current President of As-Sunnah Trust and a leading 
Islamic scholar, revealed that external groups influenced by Saudi Arabian Wahhabism 
conduct radical teachings that change the discourse of Muslims in Sri Lanka.329 The Saudi-
funded Al Haj Adul Jawad Alim Valiyullah Trust has been involved in building madrassas 
and mosques for teaching Wahhabi fundamentalism, especially in eastern Sri Lanka.330 As 
per Muslim community leader Riyaz Salley, if the money allocated for community 
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development is being used for the propagating Tawhid Jamaat extremism through private-
international schools, the Saudi Arabian government is responsible.331 Wahhabism 
teaching has created deep separations among inter-Muslim societies as well as between 
Muslims and Sinhalese. According to International Crisis Group, the Wahhabi notions332 
inculcated to Muslims by the Middle Eastern countries and Saudi Arabian religious 
organizations has created separations between Muslims in eastern Sri Lanka.333 Cleavages 
built among Muslims and Sinhalese are the result of the Wahhabi fundamentalist groups 
monetarily incentivizing Catholics and Buddhists to convert to Islam.334  
There is evidence of the violence created by Wahhabi teaching in Sri Lanka. These 
violence’s represent underlying efforts of the strict extremist Islamic fundamentalism, 
which induce monotheism, and theology. One incident involved Wahhabi followers armed 
with swords, clubs, rods, and knives storming the Beruwala Rahuman Mosque to seize it. 
These Wahhabis attacked the Muslims who were inside the mosque celebrating the annual 
Buhari feast (130th Anniversary celebrations of a Sufi Saint), killed two people, and 
damaged the mosque and a few vehicles.335 The attackers, who were inspired by 
Wahhabism for Tawhid (only one God), attacked the Rahuman Mosque to end the practice 
of celebrating saints. In another incident, in December 2006, Tawhid jihadi militants 
destroyed 117 houses, a library, and a meditation center in Kaththankudi, all of which 
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belonged to Sufis.336 These jihadi militants threatened the Sufis with firearms and swords 
saying that they would gun down the Sufis if they did not adhere to Sharia, and took away 
the body of a Sufi saint after unearthing it from a mosque grave.337 Furthermore, the 
militants abducted one person; later his body was found with gunshot injuries.338 In still 
other incidents in Kaththankudi, in 2017, extreme Wahhabis staged violence: two extreme 
Islamist groups linked with Tawhid Jamaat and other orthodox extremist religious groups 
clashed injuring several of them as well as innocent civilians.339 Earlier, in 2006, Tawhid 
Salafist youth groups attacked a Sufi mosque with hand grenades, and damaged the minaret 
of the mosque.340 Reports indicate that Sri Lankan Tawhid organizations operating in 
Kaththankudi share transnational Saudi Arabian Salafist and Wahhabi connections.341  
Beyond instituting Wahhabi teachings in mosques, Saudi Arabia has also been 
successful in instituting universities. Shenali Waduge, referring to the establishment of 
Saudi Arabian-funded Malik Abdulla University College in Kattankudy, questions why it 
is necessary to establish Muslim-only universities in Eastern Province, while there are no 
Sinhala-only universities in Sri Lanka.342 In addition to this new university, Oluvil State 
National University in Eastern Province is designed solely for Muslims.343 According to 
Eugene Cotran, “Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries are funding for propagation of 
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Wahhabi teachings through establishment of madrassas and mosques in Sri Lanka.”344 The 
Turkish NGO IHH (İnsan Hak ve Hürriyetleri) has spent $55,000 to establish the Quran 
Memorization Center in which Sri Lankan children began receiving their Islamic studies, 
such as Qur’an and Hadith classes.345  
2. International Scholarships 
 Libya and Saudi Arabia promote the Islamic revivalist-centered education through 
awarding financial aid and scholarships for Sri Lankan Muslims.346 In August 2003, the 
Egyptian government provided ten scholarships for Sri Lankan Muslims to pursue Quran, 
Sharia, Sunnah, and other Islamic studies in Egypt, Dubai, and Malaysia.347 Mohamed 
Muhsin Sharfaz Nilam, the Sri Lankan ISIS member who was killed in an air raid in Raqqa 
between May and July 2015, was a scholarship student of Sharia law from Pakistan’s 
International Islamic University.348 In addition, there are many scholarships funded by 
foreign sources that are designed to foster such professionals as engineers, doctors, etc., 
among the Muslim community in Sri Lanka.349 For example, the Islamic Development 
Bank in Saudi Arabia provides scholarships to Sri Lanka’s Muslim students to study in 
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Saudi Arabia in different fields, but all courses are designed along Islamization lines.350 
M.C.A. Hameed, the president of the All Ceylon Thareekathul Mufliheen (a religious Sufi 
society) once stated that, “Those who returned from Saudi Arabia after their academic 
studies and employment had brought down the Wahhabi Ideologies and stress them to 
implement strict Islamism in Sri Lanka culture.” Today, there are 749 madrassas, one 
university, and ten major mosques involved in teaching Wahhabism, and Wahhabis are 
gaining control of almost all the mosques in Sri Lanka, except for a few strong Sufi-
controlled ones.351  
C.  ISLAMIC ORGANIZATIONS IN SRI LANKA 
There are different types of Islamic organizations and they contribute to all areas 
of Muslim lives and communities in Sri Lanka, but at the foundation of most of these 
organizations is Islamism. Most of these groups or organizations have a common agenda 
of Muslims subordinating to Islam.352  In short, as De Munck observes, “Muslims are 
associated with Islam and Islam with Jihad and ultimately, inevitably with a battle between 
civilizations.”353 Modern Islamist agendas have persuaded Sri Lankan Muslim leaders to 
join the Pan Islamic Arabic NGO Rabitatul Alsmul Islami since its inception in 1962.354 
Furthermore, Muslim politicians have arranged official visits by Islamist propagators such 
as Dr. Said Ramadan (son-in-law of Sayyed Qutb) to address Sri Lanka Muslims on 
Islamization and brotherhood in July 1965.355 Furthermore, Johansson has observed that 
Islamist revitalization organizations like Jamaat-e-Islami and Tablighi Jamaat arrived in 
the 1970s to expedite Islamization and increase the number of mosques in Sri Lanka.356  
350 “Scholarships,” Sailan Muslim – The Online Resource for Sri Lanka Muslims, last modified 
January 25, 2015, https://www.sailanmuslim.com/category/youth/education/scholarships-
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1. Jamaat-e-Islami
Sri Lanka’s Jamaat-e-Islami is an offshoot of the Pakistani Jamaat-e-Islami, which 
was established in 1947 as a Muslim Brotherhood organization. Sayyid Abdula Mawdudi 
professed this organization for the Islamization of everything.357 Pakistan-based Jamaat-e- 
Islami is proud to be the core of radicalized Islamic groups with branches in South Asia, 
including Sri Lanka.358 Radical Buddhist monks claim that, “Jamaat-e- Islami is an Islamist 
political party which assisted to divide India and establish the Islamic State in Pakistan, 
and their branch in Sri Lanka continue its Islamization efforts.”359 This organization has 
been working in Sri Lanka to transform the Sufi traditions indigenous to Sri Lankan 
Muslims into radicalized Islamism and has made efforts to enforce political Islam.360 
McGilvray writes that the global ulema arrange the funding from Pan Islamic organizations 
for Jamaat-i-Islami and issue fatwa (Sharia interpretations).361 Furthermore, the Salafism 
and Wahhabism preached in Kaththankudi is expected to change Muslims according to 
Quran and Hadith teaching for the revival of Islamic fundamentalism.362 These internal 
factors show that Islamist efforts in Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Afghanistan have 
generated Muslim radicalization in Sri Lanka. Consequently, the BBS has created an ethnic 
awakening among Sinhalese Buddhists by highlighting the Islamization efforts of Jamaat-
e-Islami and Islamic terrorism.363 Islam as a traditional religious practice in Sri Lanka does 
not pose any threat to the society, but extremist groups that engage in political Islamism, 
seeking to implement Sharia and enforce strict Islamic-based practices, are harmful 
because they violate human rights.  
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2. Tablighi Jamaat
Tablighi Jamaat (TJ) is an Islamist reformist organization, which was founded by 
Muhammad Ilyas-Kandhlawi in 1926 in India, for the purpose of converting people 
through strict imposition of Sharia.364 Tablighi Jamaat is a radical assembly and their main 
effort in Sri Lanka is to convert non-Muslims to Islam and act as reformist activists.365 The 
TJ, which arrived in Sri Lanka in the 1950s, have their foundations in changing Sufi 
beliefs.366 The TJ endorses strict conventional Islam and eliminating the Sufi practices and 
beliefs in Sri Lankan Muslim societies.367 More precisely, TJ argues that Sufi beliefs, 
according to Sharia, are haram, and should be combated and defeated with jihad.368 At the 
height of clashes among Muslim groups, as well as complaints of BBS and other Muslim 
groups, 161 TJ Islamic celerics were deported in 2014.369 Still, the former Defense 
Secretary of Sri Lanka stated that, “Tablighi Jamaat members could re-apply for a religious 
visa to arrive in Sri Lanka and push radicals into more violence.”370 Furthermore, he said, 
“TJ could push already hardline Sri Lankan Muslims toward such more radical groups 
as Hizb ut-Tahrir and Jamaat-e-Islami.”371 Since the end of the separatist war in Sri Lanka, 
TJ has become a leading Islamist group. Still, events like international Islamic conferences 
were held in Sri Lanka with Colombo’s support, until ethno-religious tensions arose.372  
364 Barbara D. Metcalf, “Living Hadith in the Tablighi Jama`at,” The Journal of Asian Studies 52, no. 
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3. Other Islamist Organizations  
Saudi Arabia exports the hatred-filled Wahhabi teachings through its funding and 
expects to propagate a strict Islamist culture around the world.373 The Wahhabis in Sri 
Lanka motivated through a movement called Tawhid or monotheism.374 Tawhid Jamaat 
has its robust manifestations in most of the mosques in Sri Lanka and it is leading the 
construction of mosques.375 As per Amir Ali, there has been a growing trend for instigating 
ultra-religious orthodoxy toward global Ummah because of backing provided by Saudi 
Wahhabism ideologies since the 1980s.376 The conflict between Muslims and Sinhalese 
rapidly improved when Saudi Arabian-based movement Thawheed Jamaat fenced in the 
Muslims disputes.377 With the rise of Thawheed Jamaath ideologies in Kaththankudi came 
terrorist incidents against innocent civilians by attacking a Sufi gathering with swords and 
knives on Friday, March 10, 2017, after a mosque gathering.378 The innocent civilians 
protested against these extremist Islamist groups by displaying boards bearing the phrase 
“stop Wahhabi terrorism”; later it was revealed that they represented a pro-ISIS group.379 
The secretary of Tawheed Jamaath in Sri Lanka, Abdul Razick, has delivered a number of 
controversial blasphemous statements on Buddhism, degrading its religious value, which 
created further divisions among Muslims and Buddhists. Later he was taken by police for 
questioning.380 According to the International Crisis Group, there are allegations against 
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Pakistan military intelligence (ISI) for funding jihadi militants in Sri Lanka.381 Traditional 
Islam, such as Sufism, directly conflicts with the views of  groups such as Jamaat-e-Islami 
and Thablighi Jamaat.382 The internal conflicts aroused in 2007 among Islamic reformists’ 
movements in Sri Lanka were energized by global Ummah concepts of Sunnis against 
traditional Sufism.383  
D. CONCLUSION 
The mobilization of Muslims in Sri Lanka has been sparked through a pretext of 
development aid and welfare by powerful Islamic states’ economies, promoting extremism 
in Muslim communities, particularly in Eastern Province. Sri Lanka is a developing 
country; its poor economy has become dependent on international monetary assistance, 
especially from Gulf countries. Islamic and Arabic education for Muslims is the extension 
that unites Islamic state in the world, and that mobilizes Muslims, specifically in Sri Lanka. 
Islamic religious education and Arabic language education enabled by foreign economic 
assistance have become more lucrative for poor Muslims of Sri Lanka. These religious 
teachings have indoctrinated the Muslim population with interpretations of Islam that differ 
from the one traditionally held in Sri Lanka, changing the paradigms of social behavioral 
patterns of Muslims distinct to Sri Lankan Muslim culture. The foreign Islamist 
organizations appearing in Sri Lanka use different names from the ones they use in other 
countries, which may mislead local and international audiences from recognizing that these 
organizations are delivering Islamization to Sri Lankan Muslims. In any case, there is 
evidence that the Islamist groups operating in Sri Lanka have connections to major radical 
Islamist groups in the Middle East and elsewhere. Foreign Islamists are responsible for 
introducing their extreme ideologies in the hope of turning what is a minority of extremists 
in Sri Lanka into a strong majority. These distinct ideologies lead to cultural behaviors that 
encourage the Muslim community to abstain from social and ethnic interaction and 
381 ICG, “Sri Lanka’s Muslims: Caught in The Crossfire,” 25. 
382 Olivier Roy, “Islamic Radicalism in Afghanistan and Pakistan” UNHCR Emergency and Security 
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affiliation with other communities, thereby increasing the estrangement of Muslims and 











IV. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION
The Muslim minority population in Sri Lanka is mobilizing around Islamist 
politics. Conversely, Buddhist nationalists, inspired by instrumental politicians and the 
perceived threat of Islamization, are mobilizing against the Muslim population in Sri 
Lanka. This thesis has attempted to answer the questions of how and why Islamism is 
growing among the Muslim minority population of Sri Lanka. The research and analysis 
tested two hypotheses: The Muslim minority population in Sri Lanka is mobilizing around 
Islamism in reaction to growing Buddhist nationalism, and the Muslim minority population 
in Sri Lanka is mobilizing around Islamism as a result of external actors promoting 
religious extremism. The findings of this thesis cannot suggest that there were not existing 
grievances and religious differences between Muslims and Buddhists in Sri Lanka that 
external influencers could exploit. The tensions that remain from Sri Lanka’s colonial past 
and religious differences notwithstanding, it is certain that these groups were able to 
maintain ethnic harmony until the advent of religious sentiments in politics. Global 
Islamism also has much affected the ethnic relations in Sri Lanka, as it has in other parts 
of the world. At the same time, growing Buddhist nationalism has underscored and 
incubated ethnic concerns, ultimately to the detriment of the quality of life of all Sri 
Lankans.  
A. MUSLIM MOBILIZATION IN SRI LANKA 
Amir Ali argues that the worldwide goals purported by the Brotherhood or 
Islamism overwhelm with fanatic Islamist extremist goals have not affected Sri Lanka’s 
Muslims.384 The analysis frames his supposition following a comparison of the external 
radicalism of Muslims with that of Sri Lankan Muslims. Nevertheless, because Sri Lanka’s 
exposure to ethnic and religious extremism accompanied a long civil war, the population 
is fearful of this religions extremism and sensitive to its connection with terrorism. Thus, 
internal judgment of escalating Muslim radicalism is unique to Sri Lankans. As discussed 
384 Ali, “The Muslim factor in Sri Lankan Ethnic Crisis,” 253–254. 
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in Chapter II, McGilvray  and Klem,  as well as Izeth Huzain, claim some Sri Lankan 
Muslims have crossed the line to radicalism and have adversely affected other Muslims in 
the state due to its violent nature.385 The influence of Saudi Arabia on Islamic education 
debated in Chapter III of this thesis established that Sri Lanka’s Muslim leadership has 
promoted extremism, giving birth to a handful of violent extremists operating in the Eastern 
Province. Consequently, the external financial welfare segregates and isolates Sri Lanka’s 
Muslim communities, empowering some extremist Muslim groups to influence peaceful 
Muslim groups. These extremist Muslim groups interpret peaceful Muslims’ divergence 
from strict extremist practices as apostasy or infidelity, which lead to radicalization and 
Islamization attempts to control the non-extremist Muslims. 
A number of approaches has characterized radicalization. Certainly, radicalization 
arises from long-term social discrimination and unfair governance, by which privileged 
classes deprive certain classes of Muslims of their rightful social status. This radicalization 
process occurs through multifaceted means and is atypically energized in Sri Lanka 
through Islamic everyday religious factors. Feelings of vulnerability, or of ambivalence 
from living in an environment of conflict, or of frustration from enduring institutionalized 
foul play are identified as three critical mental components causing alienation among 
minority populations. Such feelings invigorate the spiritual fundamentalism and 
radicalization amongst Muslims. Further analysis also refers to segregation, abuse, bad 
reputation and self-image, use of false interpretations in Quran classes, and fanatic 
consolidation as factors leading to radicalization. Furthermore, radicalization runs closely 
parallel to violent terrorism, which could come in multiple guises. However, the analysis 
sees the radicalizing of a group as unquestionably reinforced or instigated by the influences 
of external groups.  
Religious differences and practices, as well as underlying political desires of 
instrumental politics, have divided the Sri Lankan ethnicities. The frictions highlighted in 
this thesis were heightened between the Tamils and the Muslims, reinforcing their 
competition for supremacy in politics. On the other hand, no such competition existed 
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between the Sinhalese and the Muslims until religion became prominent in their respective 
politics. This religious inclination has driven an ideological and cultural wedge among a 
few Buddhist-Sinhalese as well. Yet, as long as Tamil terrorism formed the common 
enemy, Sinhalese and Muslims maintained a positive relationship.  
Some powerful Sinhalese politicians use Buddhist fundamentalists as an instrument 
in their politics and allow them freedom to act violently, which has led to many chaotic 
incidents that aggravated the schism between the Sinhalese and the Muslim populations. 
As this thesis has shown, the Buddhist and minority fundamentalists in Sri Lanka use 
politics to profess their radical beliefs and outline controls for other ethnic and religious 
groups that do not affiliate with them. Notably, uncompromising Sinhalese Buddhist 
monks have invoked incidents of violence, such as the destruction of Bamiyan Buddha 
statues, assaults, slaughtering of cattle, and the burning of Buddhist monks in Afghanistan 
by Islamists, to justify for legitimize radical Buddhist movements against Muslims in Sri 
Lanka.  
Fear of radicalization and extremism could hinder future ethno-religious harmony 
and that could harm the solidarity of Sri Lanka. Marginal separatism is growing among 
most Sinhalese, who fear the increased number of Muslims in trade. Sinhalese Buddhists 
make efforts to control other religions, especially Islam, with an anticipatory fear that 
outside forces will reduce the Sinhalese way of life in Sri Lanka. These fears emanate from 
Buddhist monks who have observed Muslim minorities uniting around Islamism in an 
effort to change the Sri Lankan legislature and justify those changes as the exercise of 
religious rights. The endeavours of Buddhist activists for control have fractured the entire 
ethno-religious harmony; similarly, thesis finds that the consequences of Islamism and 
Islamist fanatics’ physical activities in Sri Lanka have been significant. 
Buddhist monks express their fear of transnational Islamism and Islamic 
institutions that have been energized by foreign influences to convert the Sri Lankan 
Buddhist Sinhalese into Muslims. These conversions of Sinhalese Buddhists to Islam have 
occurred through marriages, which and have increased in the recent past. Another fear 
driving Sri Lankan Buddhists to mobilize is rapid growth of the Muslim population by 
having marriages with Sinhalese women. Population growth is the highest concern of the 
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Islamic world (1.7 billion Muslims worldwide, including 2.1 million Sri Lankan 
Muslims386) and it threatens to erode Sinhalese power (16.2 million Sinhalese), which 
needs further studies to establish. This analysis finds that the fear has grown with the 
outpacing Muslim population in Sri Lanka, which at its inception was less than hundred 
people and now surpasses the Tamil population. Buddhist Sinhalese believe that this 
Muslim population is a result of their religious conviction of Ummah.  
Sri Lankan Muslim involvement in ISIS Islamist activities have widened the future 
threat to the nation. The research analysis refers to the death of a Sri Lankan Muslim ISIS 
member in Syria, the connections to bombings in India, and recent arrest of Sri Lankan 
ISIS member in Australia as the nearest cases that prove affiliations to Islamic State by Sri 
Lankan Muslims. Moreover, the reference maintain by Sri Lankan Muslim extremist 
groups to creation of caliph in Sri Lanka will remain as an additional threat to the national 
security, which need an extra care.     
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
This thesis has analyzed the evidence collected through research and drawn two 
conclusions that might be useful for the government of Sri Lanka to consider in its efforts 
to prevent further radicalization of ethno-religious groups. These conclusions are described 
in the following section. Furthermore, other vital areas merit follow-on investigations. The 
first, it would be valuable to examine the impact of Sharia and Shura applied to the Muslim 
society by analyzing the grievances of Muslims in Sri Lanka. A separate study into finding 
the exact role of foreign Islamic organizations could help trace the Islamization process. A 
study on Sri Lankan Muslim population growth in comparison to the Islamization process 
in the contemporary world could contribute to minimizing future effects of global 
fanaticism in Sri Lanka. These are only few suggestions for future research. 
386 CIA. “World Factbook - Central Intelligence Agency,” Central Intelligence Agency, accessed 
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C. CONCLUSION 
This thesis has made every attempt to examine the existing literature relevant to the 
relations of Sri Lankan Muslims and Buddhists. Based on the research, this thesis described 
how and why Islamism and radicalization grew and erupted among Sri Lankan Muslims. 
Further, thesis considered two distinct contrasting hypotheses: The Muslim minority 
population is mobilizing around Islamism in reaction to growing Buddhist nationalism in 
Sri Lanka, and the Muslim minority population in Sri Lanka is mobilizing around Islamism 
in response to external actors promoting religious extremism. The thesis reflects on several 
scholarly works that recount the effects of radicalization and notions of Islamism, 
development of Buddhist mobilization, development of Islamic fanaticism, and Islamism 
in Sri Lanka and its connection to the South Asian region and beyond. Such an assessment 
could benefit from further in-depth critical considerations of the perspectives. Especially, 
this thesis challenges the external issues and understands the essential variables relate to 
ethno-religious culture that appreciate the social and political issues existing in Sri Lanka. 
The findings of the thesis identify that Buddhist nationalism instigated against colonial 
rulers has shifted its focus against Muslims and corresponds to foreign-influenced Islamist 
reforms affecting Sri Lankan society. Similarly, the disproportionate reactions by Buddhist 
Sinhalese and Tamils unite the Muslim community while external Islamization influences 
reinforce Muslims’ resolve to mobilize against other ethno-religious communities. These 
two opposite reactions are the overriding factors as to answer how and why the Muslim 
minority in Sri Lanka is mobilizing against the other communities.  
The constant debasement of values pushed by religious concepts of politically 
radicalized devotees’ criteria has the ability to destabilize Sri Lanka to a fragile country. 
The transparency of democracy and liberty of people in Sri Lanka perspective on the 
equality maintained by GOSL. This would further depends on the perceptions and beliefs 
among ethnicities on how GOSL understands the strategic dealing with external policy 
implementation. Finally, it is extremely essential to understand how the exploitativeness 
of outsiders could endanger the states’ security and ethnic congruity. Controlling 
radicalization of Muslims and Buddhists is a prerequisite in multi-ethnic Sri Lanka to 
advance the nation’s progress. To prevent the rise of Islamism and, in turn, Buddhist 
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nationalism, Sri Lankans must understand the predominant philosophies as well as the 
specific means and end goals of both groups. Thus, it is more sensible to evaluate the 
activities of religious associations, especially, when their efforts are coordinated through 
religious affiliations beyond Sri Lanka. In this way, it is possible to test whether these 
events are indicators of a radicalization process such as Islamization, or a reflection of 
social progress, or radical changes engaging in disguise as social engagement. Therefore, 
it is essential to check rising radicalism in Sri Lanka, which is the growing enemy of social 
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